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Leveraging the Courts to Protect Women’s Fundamental Rights at 
the Intersection of Family-Wage Work Structures and Women’s 
Role as Wage Earner and Primary Caregiver 
JILL MAXWELL 
INTRODUCTION 
The gap between men’s and women’s labor force participation steadily 
narrowed for over two decades until progress slowed in the mid-1990s.1  Before 
the mid-1990s, “[w]omen, especially married mothers with young children, 
continued to enter the labor force in ever-growing numbers.  They integrated 
previously male occupations, especially middle-class occupations, and narrowed 
the earnings gap with men more in the 1980s than in any other decade . . . .”2 
Women’s labor force participation peaked at sixty percent in 1999 and has  
plateaued, and even declined, since then.3  The plateau in progress that has 
characterized the pattern of gender workplace equality since the mid-1990s 
cannot be explained as “structural or broadly ideological.”4  It is most likely the 
result of a “specifically antifeminist backlash in the popular culture.”5  This anti-
feminist backlash co-opted the feminist rhetoric of choice and equality by 
describing career mothers who leave the workplace as “opting” for full-time 
motherhood, even if the “choice” was prompted “by unsupportive work 
 
  J.D. 2007, Brooklyn Law School. Special thanks to New York City civil rights attorney, Jenn 
Rolnick Borchetta of Beldock Levine & Hoffman LLP for inspiring me to write this article and the 
many brainstorming sessions at its inception. Thanks also to the staff and editors of the Duke Journal 
of Gender Law & Policy for their thoughtful comments. 
 1. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CHANGES IN MENS AND WOMENS LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
RATES (2007) [hereinafter MEN AND WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE] available at 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.htm; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN 
THE LABOR FORCE, 1970–2009 (2011) [hereinafter WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE] available at 
http://bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110105.htm (stating that women’s employment peaked in 
1999). 
 2. David Cotter, Joan M. Hermsen & Reeve Vanneman, End of Gender Revolution? Gender Role 
Attitudes from 1977 to 2008, 117 AM. J. SOC. 259, 283 (2011);. see also id. at 265 fig.2 (comparing 
employment rates of married fathers and married mothers with a spouse present and at least one 
own-child in the household); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, SHARE OF MARRIED-COUPLE FAMILIES WITH 
AN EMPLOYED MOTHER AT ITS LOWEST, 1994–2010 (2011) [hereinafter EMPLOYED MOTHERS] available at 
http://bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110506.htm; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION RATES AMONG MOTHERS (2010) [hereinafter LABOR FORCE] available at 
http://bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100507.htm. 
 3. WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, supra note 1. 
 4. Cotter et al., supra note 2,  at 260–61. 
 5. Id. at 260. 
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environments or increased job demands.”6  By using a feminist rhetoric of 
“choice” to describe the pattern of women’s departure from the workplace in 
favor of full-time caregiving, the rhetoric remains insulated from broad criticism, 
perpetuates an inaccurate image of women’s complicated life reality as 
wageworker and caregiver, and maintains a status quo workplace structure that 
is inherently discriminatory against women. 
As this article highlights through statistics and anecdotes, a woman’s 
“choice” to leave the workplace—if the option exists at all—is not as simple as 
popular culture would let us believe.  Rather, most women, including married 
women, need to work to support their families.7  But women are also society’s 
primary caregivers of children and the elderly, whether out of necessity,8 
conformance to traditional gender roles,9 or choice.10  Because the American 
workplace structure remains rooted in the family-wage ideal,11 in which a male 
breadwinner and a female homemaker comprise each household, women must 
fit their family caregiving responsibilities into a workplace structure defined 
around the ideal worker, who does not have such responsibilities.12  The result is 
the marginalization and exclusion of women from work and stagnant progress 
towards workplace equality.13  Although women comprise close to half of the 
workforce, they lag behind men in wages and leadership positions,14 and 
continue to be discriminated against because of their caregiver status.15  And, 
although popular culture focuses on women in higher-income jobs and 
households, women in low- and middle-income jobs—those with the least 
flexible jobs and the most need for the income—carry the heaviest burden.16 
 
 6. Id. at 283–84. 
 7. See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: UNLAWFUL 
DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 6 (2007) [hereinafter 
DISPARATE TREATMENT] available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2012) (stating “[i]ncome from women’s employment is important to the economic security of 
many families, particularly among lower-paid workers, and accounts for over one-third of the income 
in families where both parents work”); LABOR FORCE, supra note 2; MADELEINE M. KUNIN, THE NEW 
FEMINIST AGENDA: DEFINING THE NEXT REVOLUTION FOR WOMEN, WORK, AND FAMILY 138 (2012). 
 8. Over nineteen percent of family households (defined as persons living together and related 
to each other by birth, marriage, or adoption) are headed by women with no husband present. See 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 1-YEAR ESTIMATES, table B11001 (2010), 
available at http://factfinder2.census.gov. While other unrelated individuals may live in some of these 
households and contribute to caregiving, there is no available data about how much these individuals 
contribute. It is likely that single mother heads of households are the only available caregivers in at 
least some of these households. See also KUNIN, supra note 7, at 138 (stating that “in many households, 
mothers have to do everything because they are single parents”). 
 9. SHARON LERNER, WAR ON MOMS 49–50 (2010). 
 10. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 26, 2003, at 44. 
 11. See infra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
 12. Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 822 (1989) (adopting the term 
“ideal worker” to describe a worker without childcare responsibilities). 
 13. Cotter et al., supra note 2, at 265. 
 14. Joan Williams & Rachel Dempsey, And the Oscar Goes to . . . a Man: Gender Bias at the Top, 
HUFFINGTON POST, (Jan. 27, 2012, 11:35 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joan-williams/and-
the-oscar-goes-toa-ma_b_1235169.html?ref=tw. 
 15. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 6. 
 16. See id. at  5. 
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This article argues that the stagnant progress in workplace equality results 
in part from the persistence of family-wage barriers.  Family-wage barriers arise 
at the intersection of a workplace designed around a worker without family 
caregiving responsibilities and women’s role as primary caregivers.17  These 
barriers manifest as work structures that favor a worker without caregiving 
responsibilities,18 and as policies and practices that penalize caregivers directly or 
indirectly, including strict adherences to work structures designed around the 
ideal worker.19  Courts recognize mistaken gender stereotype-based assumptions 
about a caregiver’s job performance as sex discrimination.20  But they have had 
few opportunities and been reluctant to recognize that family-wage barriers 
implicate and infringe on women’s fundamental constitutional rights, regardless 
of the evidence of stereotyped assumptions.21  Focusing on mothers,22 this article 
highlights the equal protection and substantive due process rights at stake for 
working women subjected to unfavorable treatment because of their status as 
caregivers, as distinguished from unfavorable treatment because of gender-
stereotyped assumptions based on that status.  Unaddressed violations of these 
rights that result from a state’s maintenance of family-wage barriers explain, in 
part, the stagnant progress of women in the workplace since the mid-1990s23 and 
reinforce gender stereotypes.  Equal protection jurisprudence has fallen short of 
recognizing that family-wage barriers are an issue of equality and, therefore, 
helps perpetuate employment inequality between men and women.  This article 
explores the role that impact litigation and the courts can have in breaking down 
family-wage barriers with prophylactic remedies that change the workplace 
structure.24 
Section I discusses the social construction of the workplace structure around 
the family-wage ideal, in which each household has a male devoted exclusively 
to paid wage work and a female devoted exclusively to family and household 
caretaking.  It discusses the way in which the law maintains and challenges the 
work/home dichotomy, paving the way for women’s presence in the workplace, 
but falling short of affecting full equality.  Although women entered the 
workforce in recent decades, inflexible work structures persist.  As a result, the 
 
 17. Caregiving responsibilities refer to informal, unpaid, family caregiving responsibilities, as 
distinguished from formal, paid caregiving arrangements. 
 18. Williams, supra note 12, at 822–23. 
 19. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 5. 
 20. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 21. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 22. This article focuses on working mothers, but uses the broad term “caregiver” as a reminder 
that women’s caregiving is not limited to their role as mothers. Many of the principles and strategies 
discussed could inform claims on behalf of caregivers generally. Although the focus is on women and 
women plaintiffs because this is an issue of women’s equality, parallel arguments might be made on 
behalf of male caregivers that challenge the same deficiency in the law. 
 23. Cotter et al., supra note 2, at 265. 
 24. This article focuses specifically on the family-wage barriers to women’s workplace 
attachment in light of the stagnant progress of women’s equal employment opportunity in recent 
decades. Undeniably, when men conform to the stereotypical role of a woman by becoming 
caregivers, their constitutional rights are also implicated. Nevertheless, discrimination against 
workers with caregiving responsibilities remains an issue of gender equality because in either case—a 
male or female caregiver—employees are penalized for assuming the stereotypical female role. 
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promise of equal employment opportunity can only be realized by women 
without caregiving responsibilities, women who are able to fit their caregiving 
responsibilities into inflexible work structures, or women whose professions 
afford them flexibility.25 
Section II explores women’s continued role as primary caregivers, despite 
their increased presence in the workplace.  It highlights the way in which 
women’s role as primary caregiver and the inflexible workplace structure 
perpetuates family-wage barriers.  Section II discusses the particular 
vulnerability of women in low- and middle-income jobs. 
Section III addresses the role of impact litigation in breaking down family-
wage barriers.  It argues that, impact litigation, regardless of the risks involved, 
has a significant place in  law and social change movements.  Without impact 
litigation to educate the courts, legislation and grassroots organizing result in 
limited progress.  In addition to educating the courts about an issue, litigation 
can spark and support legislation.  Section III argues that litigation strategies 
must accompany any efforts to eliminate family-wage barriers.  
Section IV discusses the fundamental constitutional rights implicated by 
family-wage barriers and the litigation strategies that raise these constitutional 
claims.  It begins by arguing that Title VII and the Family Medical Leave Act do 
not fully protect and are no substitute for the rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  Section IV(A) focuses on the equal protection right to equal 
employment opportunity.  It argues that the Supreme Court has already laid a 
foundation for recognizing family-wage barriers to women’s workplace 
attachment as an issue of gender equality.  And it proposes a modified 
framework for courts to use in analyzing these claims to effectively address the 
allegations of rights violations that arise from a state’s maintenance of family-
wage barriers.  Section IV(B) highlights the substantive due process rights to 
pursue an occupation and to bear and raise children.  Although these rights have 
not been recognized in the family responsibilities discrimination context and 
might be difficult to establish, raising these claims helps frame family-wage 
barriers as an issue of constitutional liberty. 
Section V discusses the power of federal courts to impose prophylactic 
remedies for fundamental rights violations, and proposes that the courts require 
changes to workplace structures that eliminate family-wage barriers and prevent 
continued violations.26  In addition to increasing women’s access to employment 
by decreasing disparate treatment and harassment of caregivers, the elimination 
of family-wage barriers  challenges the family-wage ideal.  The notion of an 
“ideal worker” will be re-conceptualized without reference to caregiving 
responsibilities, and traditional gender roles will start to be dismantled at home.  
As discussed below, equal protection clause jurisprudence evolved in 
response to the feminist critique of the 1960s and 1970s and led to women’s 
increased workforce participation.  Jurisprudence must continue to evolve in 
 
 25. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why Women Still Can’t Have It All, THE ATLANTIC (July/Aug. 
2012), at 85. 
 26. In addition to workplace structure, which is the focus of this article, other factors contribute 
to the lag in progress towards women’s workplace equality, including reproductive freedom and 
affordable childcare. 
Maxwell Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2012 10:10 AM 
 LEVERAGING THE COURTS TO PROTECT WOMEN’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 131 
order to fully protect women’s constitutional rights now that women’s role has 
changed to that of caregiver and wage earner.  A next step in that evolution is 
acknowledging that family-wage barriers implicate fundamental rights and 
remedying rights violations resulting from family-wage barriers.  Impact 
litigation puts these issues before the courts and gives them the opportunity to 
take this step. 
I. THE FAMILY-WAGE IDEAL AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORKPLACE 
STRUCTURE 
American workplace structure is rooted in and shaped around the family-
wage ideal: a conception “that the nuclear family should consist of an 
independent male breadwinner, a dependent female caregiver, and 
children . . . .”27  As Catherine Albiston chronicles, the family-wage ideal 
originated during the age of industrialization in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when some productive activities shifted out of the home.28  “This shift 
created two separate spheres of activity: the workplace,” based on a wage labor 
system, and the home, defined by task-oriented work.29  Prior to this shift, 
caregiving responsibilities were interwoven with all other productive activities, 
which could be performed at any pace.30  Notably, work was defined by the 
particular task, rather than the hours spent performing a task.  When productive 
activities shifted to outside the home, these activities became organized in 
workplaces and based on regular work patterns controlled by time, rather than 
tasks.31  The meaning of “work” became closely associated with the time-
disciplined workplace.32  The norm of standardized, full-time wage labor outside 
the home ultimately came to define work itself.33 
Although women performed wage labor, their work was increasingly low-
wage, unskilled, temporary, or part-time, and socially unacceptable for them to 
do.34  As a result, women became associated with the private home, rather than 
the public workplace, and their labor became task-oriented, non-wage labor such 
as childcare, cooking, and cleaning.35  Task-oriented labor performed at home 
became excluded from the definition of “work.”36  This emerging pattern of the 
 
 27. Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 419 (2011); See also Joan C. Williams & Heather Boushey, The Three Faces 
of Work-Family Conflict: The Poor, the Professionals, and the Missing Middle 3–4 (2010), available at 
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/ThreeFacesofWork-FamilyConflict.pdf (“In 1960 only 20 percent 
of mothers worked and only 18.5 were unmarried. Because the most common family was comprised 
of a male breadwinner and stay-at-home mother, employers were able to shape jobs around that 
ideal, with the expectation that the breadwinner was available for work anytime, anywhere, and for 
as long as his employer needed him.”). 
 28. Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1109 (2009). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1109–10. 
 32. See id. at 1110–11. 
 33. See id. at 1111. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1109, 1111. 
 36. See id. at 1111. 
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gendered division of labor was considered the morally appropriate 
arrangement.37 
The law further contributed to the gradual disassociation of task-oriented 
labor performed at home from the concept of work.38  For example, work that 
gave rise to property rights only included labor performed outside the home.39 
Furthermore, the law perpetuated the family-wage system in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries by upholding restrictions on women’s participation in 
work outside the home.  These restrictions were based on an idea of the 
“constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine 
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, [and] indicates the domestic sphere 
as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of            
womanhood . . . .”40  In upholding these laws, the Supreme Court opined that 
“nature” was “repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and 
independent career from that of her husband.”41  The Supreme Court adopted, 
endorsed, and perpetuated the gender segregated work/home dichotomy. 
State laws, such as those restricting women’s working hours, were upheld 
based on women’s status as present or future mothers.42  These laws reinforced 
and were socially accepted because of the cultural expectation of the male 
breadwinner-female caregiver norm.43  They contributed to the establishment of 
work as a fundamental element of men’s identity and domesticity as the 
fundamental element of women’s identity.44 
In response to this historical division of work, legal feminists developed a 
critique of the family-wage system in the 1960s and 1970s.45 The feminist critique 
led to antidiscrimination legislation and the evolution of constitutional 
jurisprudence recognizing women’s rights to social and economic 
independence.46 Constitutional law began to “place[] a spotlight on the 
burdensome nature of legislation that confined women to a separate sphere” and 
 
 37. See id. at 1119. As Albiston points out, not only was the gendered division of labor a result of 
an ideology that associated women with domesticity, but it also resulted from the exclusion of 
women from many forms of wage labor as a means to control competition between workers as 
opportunities for economic support, such as land ownership, diminished. 
 38. Justice Ruth B. Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of 
Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 266 (1997). 
 39. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1109, 1118. 
 40. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (stating “civil law, as well as nature herself, has 
always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man 
is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender.”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. The first of such laws was enacted in Massachusetts in 1874 and limited the amount of time 
that women could work per day to ten hours. By 1900 fourteen states had enacted similar laws and 
by the mid-1960s all states had some type of legislation restricting women from working. Jo Freeman, 
Revolution for Women in Law and Public Policy, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE, 365–404 (Jo 
Freeman ed., 1995); see also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding an Oregon law 
which restricted the employment of women in factories, laundries, or other “mechanical 
establishments” to ten hours per day). 
 43. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1120. 
 44. Id. at 1121. 
 45. Dinner, supra note 27, at 419. 
 46. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 268–70. 
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to recognize how the “state impeded both men and women from pursuit of the 
very opportunities and styles of life that could enable them to break away from 
traditional patterns and develop their full, human capacities.”47 
These developments paved the way for women to enter the workforce in the 
last half of the twentieth century.   Since the 1970s, there has been a steep rise in 
women’s workforce participation, including the participation of women with 
children.48  Today, women make up almost half (forty-eight percent) of the 
workforce49 and “the proportion of families that fit the traditional breadwinner 
model has declined substantially.”50  In seventy percent of households with 
children, both parents work, and nearly a quarter of Americans care for elders.51 
Nonetheless, the workplace structure remains inflexible and designed 
around an ideal worker without caregiving responsibilities.52  For working 
parents, shouldering caregiving and work responsibilities presents a heavy and 
exacting burden.  One survey revealed that thirty percent of those surveyed had 
to cut down on work for at least one day each week in order to address family 
care needs.53  Over  sixty-four percent of American families with children work 
more than  eighty hours per week.54  Almost “three-quarters of working adults 
say they have little or no control over their schedule.”55  Moreover, lower-income 
workers have the least control over their schedule.56  One study found that one-
third of working-class workers cannot decide when to take breaks, almost sixty 
percent cannot choose the start and endtimes of their workdays, and fifty-three 
percent cannot take time off to care for sick children.57  Sixty-eight percent of 
working-class families are entitled to less than two weeks of vacation and sick 
time combined.58  
These inflexible workplace structures can ultimately mean unemployment 
or part-time and temporary employment for workers with caregiving 
responsibilities.59  Inflexible hours are also associated with higher stress levels 
and poorer health, further contributing to the threat of economic insecurity.60 The 
 
 47. Id. at 270. 
 48. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1124–25. 
 49. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 1. 
 50. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1125. 
 51. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 4, 36. Indeed, having all adults in a household 
employed is an economic necessity for most families. 
 52. Id. at 3–4. 
 53. CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED: WHEN “OPTING OUT” 
IS NOT AN OPTION 11 [hereinafter ONE SICK CHILD] (2006). 
 54. Id. at 8. 
 55. Id.; see also NEW AM. FOUND., THE WAY WOMEN WORK (2004), available at 
http://www.newamerica.net/files/archive/Doc_File_1504_1.pdf (stating that fifty-three percent of 
working women caregivers say they cannot take time off from work to care for a child; forty-nine 
percent say they lack flexibility in starting and ending times at work). 
 56. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 8. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. LERNER, supra note 9, at 6–15 (telling the story of Devorah Gartner, discussed infra Section 
III(A)(2); see also ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 9–10. 
 60. Kristina Fiore, Employees Healthier When Boss is Flexible, MEDPAGE TODAY (Feb. 17, 2010), 
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PublicHealthPolicy/WorkForce/18529. 
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difficulties that most workers have in balancing caregiving responsibilities with 
work illustrate the burdens imposed by family-wage barriers.  As discussed in 
the following section, women bear a disproportionate share of the burden 
because they remain society’s primary caregivers.  As a result, family-wage 
barriers raise issues of women’s employment equality and liberty.  Impact 
litigation strategies should be used to raise these issues before the courts so that 
they can be recognized as implicating the constitutional rights of women. 
II. THE DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT OF AN INFLEXIBLE WORKPLACE STRUCTURE ON 
WOMEN 
Despite the progress in employment equality since the 1970s, as women’s 
presence has expanded into the work sphere, men’s presence has not 
proportionally expanded into the home sphere.  Women remain society’s 
primary caregivers61 and perform the vast majority of domestic chores.62  The 
division of domestic labor in heterosexual couples has not kept pace with 
changes in women’s lives outside the home; women continue to do the vast 
majority of the housework and caregiving.63  As women head the majority of 
single-parent households,64 the burden on working parents that results from an 
inflexible workplace falls disproportionately on women and limits their 
employment opportunities.  The limitation on women’s employment 
opportunities subsequently affects their economic security.65 
Despite the steep increase in women’s labor force participation until the 
mid-1990s, women remain at the margins of the workplace.  Women, particularly 
those with children, continue to face significant barriers to employment because 
of inflexible workplace structures based on an outdated ideal.66  Women fill 
fewer leadership and management positions than men.67  Full-time working 
women’s median weekly wages are about eighty percent of full-time working 
men’s wages.68  Annually, a full-time working woman earns seventy-seven cents 
to every dollar a man earns.69  Twenty-seven percent of working women work 
part-time, compared to thirteen percent of men.70 
 
 61. DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 62. LERNER, supra note 9, at 39. 
 63. Id. at 38. 
 64. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MORE YOUNG ADULTS ARE LIVING IN THEIR PARENTS’ HOME, CENSUS 
BUREAU REPORTS (2011) available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/ 
families_households/cb11-183.html (indicating that eighty-seven percent of children who live with 
one parent live with their mother); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN FAMILIES AND LIVING 
ARRANGEMENTS: 2011 Table C3 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/families/ 
data/cps2011.html. 
 65. See DISPARATE TREATMENT, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 66. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 1126. 
 67. Williams & Dempsey, supra note 14. 
 68. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN’S EARNINGS AS A PERCENT OF MEN’S IN 2010 (2012) 
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2012/ted_20120110.htm; see Albiston, supra note 28, at 
1126. 
 69. ARIANE HEGEWISCH & ANGELA EDWARDS, INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S POLICY, THE GENDER 
WAGE GAP: 2011 (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-
wage-gap-2011-1/at_download/file. 
 70. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK Table 20 (2011) [hereinafter 
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Furthermore, when women become mothers they are increasingly 
marginalized in the workplace.71  Motherhood causes their earnings to flatten or 
decrease.72  If mothers remain in the workforce, they are relegated into lower-
paying positions or part-time positions with little opportunity for 
advancement.73   Women are more likely than men to work part-time for reasons 
related to child care problems, family or personal obligations, or school;  forty-
five percent of women who work part-time say that the reason is related to work-
life balance, as compared to twelve percent of men.74   Working mothers are held 
to higher performance standards in terms of attendance and punctuality, and 
working mothers who take advantage of leave policies are evaluated more 
negatively than workers who do not take advantage of leave policies.75  As 
discussed more fully below, employers harass and retaliate against workers 
because of their caregiving responsibilities.76 
Women are more likely than men to be alienated from the workplace after 
having children.  When childcare fails, women are more likely than men to take 
time off work.77  In general, women’s careers are more likely than men’s to be 
scaled back or abandoned entirely in favor of caregiving responsibilities.78  
Although this might result from personal (or household) preference, considering 
the fact that many women want and need to work to support themselves and 
their families it is more likely the combination of several factors. Inflexible 
workplace structures and discrimination79 make working simply not possible for 
women.  Indeed, eighty-seven percent of highly educated women cite inflexible 
work schedules as a key reason for why they left the workforce.80 
Existing laws have made progress in opening up employment opportunities 
to those who are able to operate within a workplace structure developed around 
a male breadwinner norm.  But judicial precedent interpreting Title VII and the 
Equal Protection Clause ignores the extent to which work structures are based on 
 
2011 DATABOOK]; Albiston, supra note 28, at 1126. 
 71. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 90–91 (2003). 
 72. LERNER, supra note 9, at 18. 
 73. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1126. 
 74. THE WAY WOMEN WORK, supra note 55. 
 75. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1126–27. 
 76. See, e.g., Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 45 (stating “[a]mong low-income women, this 
kind of discrimination is often triggered when a woman announces her pregnancy at work; women 
in the middle are more likely to face bias when they return to work after the baby is born”). 
 77. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 11 (highlighting that when a tag-teaming arrangement fails, 
almost one-quarter of men compared to over one-third of women had to take time off from work). 
 78. LERNER, supra note 9, at 52; see also AMERICAN ASSOC. OF UNIV. WOMEN, THE SIMPLE TRUTH 
ABOUT THE GENDER PAY GAP 9 (2010) (stating that ten years after college graduation, twenty-three 
percent of mothers verses one percent of fathers were out of the workforce; seventeen percent of 
mothers verses two percent of fathers working part-time). 
 79. These are the barriers to women’s workplace attachment that are the focus of this article. 
Nevertheless, several other factors prevent women from accessing employment opportunities equal 
to men, including lack of affordable childcare and reproductive choice, both of which are related to 
women’s status as primary caregiver. 
 80. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 54. 
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outdated conceptions of family, gender, and work.81  Women’s  limited access to 
employment opportunities equal to those of their male counterparts threatens 
women’s economic security.82  
Furthermore, women already account for the majority of low-wage workers 
and poor people.83  The women in lower- and middle-income groups, who hold 
some of the least flexible jobs and rely heavily on income from consistent work,84 
have the most limited access to quality, affordable, and dependable childcare, 
and face the most precarious circumstances.85  Low-income working families 
account for more than half of working parents.86  Single mothers head about one-
quarter of households; the median income of single-mother households is only 
one-third of that for married-couple families, and the majority of poor children 
live in single-mother households.87  Low- and middle-income women are more 
likely than their higher-income counterparts to miss work because their childcare 
arrangements fail, presumably because they are less likely to rely on childcare 
centers than their higher-income counterparts.88  Missing work jeopardizes their 
employment.89  
Additionally, in contrast “to highly paid workers, keeping less-well-paid 
workers is less likely to be a money-saving endeavor” for employers.90  This 
makes low- and middle-income workers less likely to be granted flexibility in 
their work structure and more likely to be fired.91  Without being required to 
offer flexible work structures, employers have little incentive to change the 
workplace structure for any worker.92  Employers have the least incentive to 
make changes for the workers who need them the most. 
Judicial precedent treats strict, inflexible work schedules and employment 
policies based on an ideal worker without caregiving responsibilities—a male 
worker—as inherent to the nature of work, rather than the result of social 
constructions.93  By requiring all workers to operate within an inherently 
discriminatory work structure, the law perpetuates the male breadwinner-female 
 
 81. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1153–54. 
 82. THE WAY WOMEN WORK, supra note 55. 
 83. LERNER, supra note 9, at 71. 
 84. Low-income women are the least likely women, across income groups, to be employed. They 
tend to have access to better childcare than middle-income families because it is subsidized. Williams 
& Boushey, supra note 27, at 36. 
 85. “Women with high-paying jobs are far more likely to get flextime, paid vacations, paid 
maternity leave, and sick days than are women with lower-paying ones, despite the fact that lower-
income workers can least afford to be docked pay or lose a job.” LERNER, supra note 9, at 62–63. 
 86. Id. at 71. 
 87. THE WOMEN’S LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, SINGLE MOTHERHOOD IN THE U.S. – A SNAPSHOT 
(2012), available at http://www.legalmomentum.org/our-work/women-and-poverty/resources--
publications/single-mothers-snapshot.pdf. 
 88. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 10–11; Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 8 (stating that 
thirty percent of low- and middle-income families rely on childcare facilities; thirty-seven percent of 
professional-managerial families rely on childcare facilities). 
 89. ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 53, at 11. 
 90. LERNER, supra note 9, at 66. 
 91. Id. at 66–67. 
 92. See id. at 67. 
 93. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1153–54. 
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caregiver model and the exclusion of women from employment opportunities.94  
Comments based on stereotypes about the roles of men and women continue to 
appear in judicial opinions and undoubtedly cloud the lens through which 
family-wage barriers are viewed.95  The discussion that follows reveals the extent 
to which rights relating to work developed irrespective of those rights relating to 
caregiving, illustrating how the law maintains the dichotomy between work and 
family.  That one remedy simultaneously protects these rights undermines 
judicial precedent’s treatment of these spheres as separate from, and opposed to, 
one another.96  Impact litigation can educate courts, legislatures, and the public 
about the fundamental rights at stake at the intersection of outdated, inflexible 
work structures, women’s workforce participation, and caregiving 
responsibilities. 
III. USING IMPACT LITIGATION TO ELIMINATE FAMILY-WAGE BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S 
WORKPLACE ATTACHMENT 
This article’s focus on constitutional impact litigation strategies 
supplements the existing family responsibilities discrimination scholarship, 
which predominately proposes legislation, consensus-building strategies and 
organizing for removing family-wage barriers to women’s workplace 
attachment.97  Undoubtedly, constraints accompany constitutional impact 
litigation.  Impact litigation can be costly, time-consuming, and risky.98  But 
courts inevitably have a role in any law and social change agenda; strategically 
leveraging that role is essential to eliminating family-wage barriers.99  As 
Douglas NeJaime argues, “sophisticated social movement lawyers engage in 
 
 94. See, e.g., Idhardt v. Sara Lee Corp., 118 F.3d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that there was 
no Title VII violation where a pregnant part-time employee is terminated instead of less senior full-
time employees); Armstrong v. Flowers Hosp. Inc., 33 F.3d 1308, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding 
that an employer was not obligated to change assignments of a pregnant employee to accommodate 
her pregnancy); Gee-Thomas v. Cingular Wireless, 324 F. Supp. 2d 875, 880–81 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) 
(granting summary judgment to defendant in a case where plaintiff was a mother of five and alleged 
she was not considered for a promotion because of her status as a mother when there was evidence 
that the man who received the position was a father); Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 
1996 WL 374151, *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) (granting summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s 
failure to promote her claim that she was on track to be promoted before becoming a mother and was 
passed over for promotions after having children because of plaintiff’s lack of a male comparator). 
 95. See, e.g., Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a reasonable jury 
could find sex discrimination in the case of an employee who was passed over for a promotion 
because of her childcare responsibilities,  but also stating that “[r]ealism requires acknowledgement 
that the average mother is more sensitive than the average father to the possibly disruptive effect on 
children of moving to another city . . .”). 
 96. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 269–70. 
 97. Joan C. Williams and Elizabeth S. Westfall propose Title VII litigation strategies for 
overcoming the maternal wall. Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructing the Maternal 
Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of “Carers” in the Workplace, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 31, 37–39 (2006). 
 98. See Douglas NeJaime, Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 965–66, 955 (2011). 
 99. See id. at 965–66, 968–69 (describing litigation loss as a means of raising awareness and 
describing how social movement lawyers strategically leverage the court as an element of a social 
change agenda). 
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multidimensional advocacy that moves beyond, but not without, litigation.”100  
Litigation helps educate the Supreme Court and lower federal courts about 
a changing cultural landscape and can make them more receptive to progressive 
legislation or to broader interpretations of preexisting statutes, such as Title VII 
and the Family Medical Leave Act.101  The judiciary and Congress share a 
symbiotic relationship in remedying constitutional violations.  Full protection 
against gender discrimination will only progress as far as the narrowest 
definition of a rights violation.102  Courts need help to implement and enforce 
their decisions; the legislature can supply that help.103  Conversely, when faced 
with the application of a statute intended to have broad-sweeping remedies, a 
court not adequately versed in the cultural climate of the era might not apply the 
statute as intended.  Indeed, the Supreme Court tends towards narrow 
interpretations of employment discrimination laws.  Two examples, discussed 
shortly, are the Supreme Court’s failure to recognize Title VII claims of 
pregnancy discrimination104 and equal pay.105  Additionally, the Supreme Court 
defines the scope of constitutional rights and appropriate remedies to protect 
those rights. Judicial interpretation is the driving force in the evolution of the 
Constitution’s protections.106  For example, in 1873, the Supreme Court held that 
women could be legally excluded from the practice of law in Illinois;107 in 1996 
the Supreme Court held that Virginia could not exclude qualified women from 
the Virginia Military Institute.108  Claims of constitutional rights violations give 
the Supreme Court an opportunity to recognize a fundamental right in a 
particular context unique to the era.  Such claims also give the Supreme Court an 
opportunity to change a cumbersome, widely criticized analytical framework, 
such as McDonnell Douglas.109  These claims have the potential to reform the law 
 
 100. Id. at 990. 
 101. See Williams & Westfall, supra note 97. 
 102. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 270. 
 103. See Scott L. Cummings, Litigation at Work: Defending Day Laborers in Los Angeles, 58 UCLA L. 
REV. 1617, 1675–76 (2011). 
 104. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976). 
 105. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 628–29 (2007). 
 106. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 268–69; Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage 
Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV.  LAW & SOC. CHANGE 
567, 580 (1993–1995). 
 107. Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 U.S. 130, 142 (1873). 
 108. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555–56 (1996). 
  109. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aiken, 460 U.S. 711, 715–716 (1983) (adopting a 
flexible interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas requirements). In Aiken, the Court held “[a]ll courts 
have recognized that the question facing triers of fact in discrimination cases is both sensitive and 
difficult. The prohibitions against discrimination contained in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reflect an 
important national policy. There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental 
processes. But none of this means that trial courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination 
differently from other ultimate questions of fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more 
difficult by applying legal rules which were devised to govern the allocation of burdens and order of 
presentation of proof, in deciding this ultimate question.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Tex. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–60 (1981) (explaining some of the 
difficulties encountered by courts while interpreting the burden-shifting requirements of the 
McDonnell Douglas framework); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach 
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703, 703–05 (1995) (explaining various 
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as well as spark new legislation.110 
Regardless of the ultimate success of a particular case, constitutional 
litigation educates the courts about the cultural frame of the era, which can in 
turn inform and spark legislative remedies for rights violations.  Impact litigation 
thus clarifies the scope of constitutional rights in specific contexts and creates a 
public record that can encourage grassroots organization and bolster consensus-
building.111  Therefore, even failed litigation can be a necessary predecessor to 
later litigation successes by beginning to transform the claim from something 
seemingly impossible to something possible.112  The “sex-plus“ theory of 
employment discrimination under Title VII, for example, was unrecognized by 
the Supreme Court in several cases before it was finally accepted.113  
A litigation loss can also spur legislation that responds to and attempts to 
rectify an unjust outcome.  Litigation can emphasize the urgency of legislative 
action.114  Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”)115 after 
women’s rights activists failed to convince the  Supreme Court to treat 
pregnancy discrimination as a sex-equality issue.  In passing the PDA, Congress 
relied on the same arguments advanced in the Supreme Court.116  Similarly, the 
Fair Pay Act117 was enacted to remedy the Supreme Court’s rejection of an equal 
pay claim under Title VII.  In enacting the Fair Pay Act, Congress relied on 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent articulating the discrimination against women and the 
need for a legislative response.118 
Additionally, courts are public forums; litigation creates a public record of 
personal experiences and tells an individual story.119  Even if litigation is 
unsuccessful, or perhaps especially if litigation is unsuccessful,120 these personal 
stories document a broader social reality.  The record of personal stories in 
individual cases can garnish public interest in and support for the issue, 
mobilizing grassroots or political organizations.121  Again, the Fair Pay Act 
 
criticisms and difficulties courts have encountered while implementing the McDonnell Douglas 
framework). 
 110. Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 270. 
 111. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Douglas NeJaime, Lawyering for Marriage Equality, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1235, 1317–18 (2010) (describing the role of litigation in the fight for marriage equality in 
California). 
 112. NeJaime, supra note 98, at 964. 
 113. Heather M. Kolinsky, Taking Away An Employer’s Free Pass: Making the Case For a More 
Sophisticated Sex-Plus Analysis in Employment Discrimination Cases, 36 VT. L. REV. 327, 340–41 (2011). 
 114. NeJaime, supra note 98, at 998–99. 
 115. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978). 
 116. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives From the Women’s 
Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 641 (1986). 
 117. Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(5) (2009). 
 118. NeJaime, supra note 98, at 999. 
 119. See id. at 1000. 
 120. Id. at 985 (arguing that “litigation loss may raise consciousness and mobilize constituents, but 
it may do so most effectively by inspiring outrage, strengthening resolve, and building a more fervent 
feeling of entitlement . . .”). 
 121. Cummings, supra note 103, at 1622–23 (opining that “litigation may be useful in framing 
grievances in justice terms, conferring legitimacy on a movement’s claims, generating favorable 
publicity, raising consciousness among a movement’s constituency, and fostering empowerment”). 
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exemplifies this.  Lilly Ledbetter sued her employer for paying her significantly 
less than her male counterparts over the course of her almost twenty-year career. 
Her claim was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court based on the statute of 
limitations.  But her efforts, which included testifying before Congress, garnered 
enough support to amend the law to loosen the statute of limitations for equal 
pay claims. 
The litigation strategy proposed below asks courts to recognize rights 
violations in new contexts and adopt a modified analytical framework that better 
allows violations to be remedied.  This strategy is inevitably risky because it 
encourages courts to recognize constitutional protections in a new context. But 
any potential difficulties in bringing these claims, and the possibility that they 
might initially fail, do not justify not pursuing them in court.  At the very least, 
bringing these claims empowers individual women who are forced to choose 
between work and caring for their children.  These claims bring the complexity 
of this choice to the fore. 
Ensuring that the most marginalized and vulnerable are entitled to 
protections requires establishing that family-wage barriers are an issue of gender 
equality and implicate fundamental constitutional rights.  Only the Court can 
recognize constitutional rights and it can only do so through the cases and 
controversies before it.  Thus, impact litigation must be used to break down 
family-wage barriers and change the status quo. 
IV. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY FAMILY-WAGE BARRIERS TO WOMEN’S 
WORKPLACE ATTACHMENT 
The presence of family-wage barriers is an issue of constitutional 
importance, implicating rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection and Due 
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.122  This section argues that the 
state’s perpetuation of family-wage barriers violates women’s right to equal 
employment opportunity—as guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause 
(“EPC”)123—and infringes on women’s fundamental right to bear and raise 
children and pursue a career of one’s choice—as guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause.124 
Highlighting the continued violations of these rights reveals the limits of 
federal statutes such as Title VII and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”)125 
in fully ensuring women’s ultimate freedom and equality as guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  Passed pursuant to Congress’ power to remedy widespread 
violations of the EPC, these statutes provide a floor, not a ceiling, in protecting 
against and remedying constitutional rights violations.  Because it is the body 
 
 122. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 123. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–27, 729–30 (2003) (noting that 
Congress retains the power to enact legislation addressing employment discrimination on the basis of 
gender both remedially and prophylactically on constitutional grounds). 
 124. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (observing that an individual sphere of privacy can be 
found in the guarantee of individual liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 125. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1991); Family and Medical Leave 
Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
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charged with defining the scope of the Constitution’s guarantees, the Court can 
protect constitutional rights without relying on federal statutes.  To the extent 
that courts rely on these statutes instead of recognizing constitutional 
guarantees, framing women’s workplace attachment as a constitutional issue 
resets the appropriate balance of powers between the Supreme Court and the 
Legislature.  
Recognizing that family-wage barriers implicate constitutional rights 
ensures that if and when Congress passes laws affording greater remedies to 
family-wage barriers, the laws would be upheld by the Court as valid exercises 
of Congress’ Section 5 power.126  Additionally, the laws would have a solid 
foundation in EPC rights recognition.  In emphasizing the scope of these rights, 
this article proposes impact litigation strategies to challenge the discriminatory 
workplace structures that courts treat as inherent to work and to urge the courts 
to remedy these fundamental rights violations through exercise of their Article 
III powers.127 
Because women’s workplace attachment is primarily an issue of equality, 
this section begins with a discussion of the equal protection rights at stake and 
proposes a new framework through which to analyze these equal protection 
claims.  Following the discussion of possible claims for a violation of the EPC, 
this article discusses claims based on the Substantive Due Process Clause. 
A. Equal Protection Right to Equal Employment Opportunity 
Family-wage barriers to women’s workplace attachment implicate 
fundamental rights protected by the EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment.   The 
EPC states that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”128  It is well established that the EPC guarantees 
freedom from gender discrimination and protects the right to equal employment 
opportunity regardless of gender.129   Indeed, Title VII and the FMLA130 were 
enacted to enforce this Constitutional right.131  But, while Title VII and the FMLA 
have helped change the composition of the workforce, these laws have not 
significantly changed the structure of the workplace to incorporate women’s 
experience as the primary caregivers.132  In addition to a claim based on 
impermissible sex stereotypes, a “sex-plus”133 theory of liability is the primary 
 
 126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 127. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 128. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 129. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C. § 2601. 
 131. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–27 (2003) (acknowledging that the 
FMLA was enacted pursuant to Congress’ Section 5 power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Ussery v. Louisiana ex rel. Dep’t of Health and Hosps., 150 F.3d 431, 437 
(5th Cir. 1998) (indicating that Congress relied on its Section 5 power to abrogate state immunity from 
claims under Title VII as the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit states 
from discriminating on the basis of gender); see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) 
(analyzing an equal protection right to be free from gender discrimination). 
 132. See supra Sections I–II. 
 133. “Sex-plus” refers to a policy or practice by which an employer classifies an individual on the 
basis of sex plus another characteristic. The employer does not discriminate against an entire class of 
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theory through which Title VII protects against disparate treatment of working 
mothers.134  But the complainants must allege that they are being treated 
differently than a comparable subclass of the opposite sex.  This requirement 
places significant limitations on the effectiveness of Title VII in achieving full 
equality135 because, as the statistics above136 evidence, male caregiver 
comparators are not always available.137  As a result, many claims based on this 
theory do not survive the initial litigation stages.138 
Likewise, EPC gender discrimination jurisprudence targeting sex 
stereotypes seeks to, and to some degree does, prevent a state from reinforcing or 
forcing individuals into traditional sex roles.139  But the EPC jurisprudence 
reinforces time norms and work structures that evolved based on a male worker 
without caregiving responsibilities.140  It is, therefore, of limited use in remedying 
discrimination against mothers.  The EPC jurisprudence focuses on whether an 
employer assumed, based on traditional sex-role stereotypes, that a working 
mother would not or should not be as dedicated or as good a worker as a man or 
a woman without children.141  In this analysis, a “dedicated” or “good” worker is 
viewed in the context of a workplace structure designed around a man or a 
woman without children.142  Therefore, the sex-stereotype jurisprudence does not 
protect a woman who does not conform to the traditional sex-role stereotype of a 
working mother, insofar as she is simultaneously a dedicated and good worker 
and caregiver, yet cannot fit her caregiving responsibilities into a work structure 
designed around workers without such responsibilities.  As a result, when 
women are faced with the impossible choice between work and family, the equal 
employment opportunity ideal succumbs to the male breadwinner-female 
caregiver model.143  
 
men or women, but against a subclass of men or women. Back, 365 F.3d at 118–19 nn.7–9. 
 134. The Supreme Court first recognized that Title VII protects against “sex-plus” discrimination 
in 1971. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curiam). Although the Supreme 
Court reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendant-employer, alleged to have 
discriminated because of its policy not to hire women with children but permitting the hiring of men 
with children, the Court did so because an issue of fact remained as to whether the condition in 
question was “a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
that particular business or enterprise.” Id. at 544. Marshall’s concurrence disagreed that a bona fide 
qualification “could be established by a showing that some women, even the vast majority, with pre-
school-age children have family responsibilities that interfere with job performance and that men do 
not usually have such responsibilities.” Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).  Marshall’s concurrence more 
accurately captures the law as it has evolved to prohibit sex-stereotyped assumptions about 
caregivers as workers. 
 135. Kolinsky, supra note 113, at 344–47. 
 136. See supra Section II. 
 137. Kolinsky, supra note 113, at 345. 
 138. See, e.g., id. at 344–50. 
 139. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736–38 (2003). 
 140. Albiston, supra note 28, at 1154 (arguing that “stereotype theories also run the risk of reifying 
time norms and work structures. These theories emphasize that employers may not presume that 
pregnant women will take time off work, but they also suggest that if a pregnant woman needs time 
off or an accommodation, that would be a different situation and outcome.”). 
 141. Id. at 1154–55. 
 142. Williams, supra note 12, at 822. 
 143. See supra Sections I–II. 
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Thus, EPC gender discrimination jurisprudence perpetuates the reification 
of sex-stereotyped roles, and in turn perpetuates the stereotypes that it seeks to 
eradicate.  By failing to adequately address discrimination against mothers, EPC 
jurisprudence also tolerates intra-class preferences by allowing discrimination 
against those within the protected class of women who conform to the stereotype 
of that class.  While it is a violation of the EPC to make an employment decision 
based on a candidate’s gender, it is not a violation to make a decision based on 
her caregiving responsibilities.  Employers are permitted to evaluate candidates 
based on characteristics that set them apart from their class.144  For this reason, 
EPC jurisprudence must evolve to respond to the ways in which family-wage 
barriers exclude women from the workforce. 
1. Discrimination Against Caregivers is an Issue of Gender Equality 
Whether she suffers an outright denial of work or a more subtle form of 
discrimination, if a woman faces discrimination because she is a mother or 
caregiver, it should be recognized as sex discrimination in violation of the EPC.  
After all, “[a] mother is still a woman. And if she is denied work outright because 
she is a mother, it is because she is a woman.”145  The Court already laid the 
foundation to recognize that family-wage barriers are an issue of women’s 
equality.146  In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court 
acknowledged that discrimination against women in the workplace can manifest 
itself under a guise of practices targeting caregivers, and that discrimination 
against caregivers is an issue of gender equality.147  In Hibbs, the Court addressed 
whether Congress’ enactment of the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’ 
Section 5 power to enforce the equal protection right to be free from gender 
discrimination in the workplace.148  In upholding the FMLA, the Court 
determined that the scope of the EPC right to be free from gender discrimination 
protects against a state’s “unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of, 
gender-based discrimination”149 through the discriminatory application of 
facially neutral state laws and policies.150  
In Hibbs, the Court reiterated that “[i]t can hardly be doubted that . . . 
women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . in 
the job market.”151  The Congressional findings endorsed by the Court  support 
the conclusion that adverse action against caregivers is, in fact, adverse action 
against women.152  Those findings reveal that “the lack of employment policies to 
 
 144. Kolinsky, supra note 113, at 351. 
 145. AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 727 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir, 1969) (Brown, C. J., dissenting)). 
 146. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 734 (2003). 
 147. Id. at 736–37; see also Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 85–86. 
 148. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 738–39. 
 149. Id. at 735. 
 150. Id. at 732. 
 151. Id. at 730 (quoting  Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)); see Chadwick v. 
WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2009) (describing the Hibbs opinion as an opinion where ”the 
Supreme Court took judicial notice of the stereotype that women, not men, are responsible for family 
caregiving”). 
 152. See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 730 (describing discriminatory leave policies). 
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accommodate working parents can force individuals to choose between job 
security and parenting” and, “due to the nature of the roles of men and women 
in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on 
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it 
affects the working lives of men.”153  Taken together, “the lack of employment 
policies to accommodate” parents affects the working lives of women more than 
men.154  The result is the marginalization of women into part-time, lower-paid, or 
lower-positioned jobs.155  A state’s refusal to provide leave is like its maintenance 
of family-wage barriers when it takes employment actions based on caregiving—
such as assigning caregivers to undesirable shifts,156 not considering them for 
promotions,157 or firing them158—and does not offer alternative work 
arrangements for people with caregiving responsibilities.  Maintenance of 
family-wage barriers “exclude[s] far more women than men from the 
workplace.”159 And it “do[es] little to combat the stereotypes about the roles of 
male and female employees.”160  Relying on Hibbs, courts can use  similar 
statistics  presented to  them in individual cases to recognize an EPC violation 
based on the state’s maintenance of family-wage barriers. 
An EPC claim based on caregiver status shares the same foundation with, 
and is a necessary counterpart to and an extension of, existing jurisprudence that 
targets state conduct based on sex stereotypes.  The claim based on caregiver 
status challenges a state’s reinforcement of traditional sex roles. Until courts 
recognize such claims, and for as long as women remain society’s primary 
caregivers, women and men alike will be forced into their traditional roles as 
caregiver and breadwinner.  Women will continue to be marginalized in the 
workplace.  And, as a result, the EPC’s guarantee of equal employment 
opportunity regardless of gender will not be fully realized for women—or for 
men who assume roles that are stereotypically those of women. 
2. Equal Protection Claim Based on Caregiver Status as a Proxy for Gender 
To establish a claim for gender discrimination in violation of the EPC, a 
plaintiff must prove that she suffered purposeful or intentional discrimination on 
the basis of gender.161  Discrimination based on gender, once proven, is only 
 
 153. Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a)(3), (5) (2006). 
 154. Id. at § 2601(a)(3). 
 155. See supra Section II. 
 156. See Parker v. Delaware Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 11 F. Supp. 2d 467, 471 (D. Del. 1998) (relating 
that the plaintiff, who requested not to be given rotating shifts because she could not coordinate 
daycare, was placed on rotating shifts as punishment for complaints she made about sex 
discrimination). 
 157. See Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004) (imparting that a female sales 
representative was passed over for a promotion because she had children and her supervisor did not 
think that she would want to relocate). 
 158. See Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d. 502, 503 (Va. 1997) (finding that working mother 
was terminated after giving birth because her employer considered her unreliable as a result of 
having a newborn). 
 159. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003). 
 160. Id. at 734. 
 161. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107,118 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Vill. 
of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1977)). 
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permissible if the state provides an “exceedingly persuasive” justification for the 
rule or practice (i.e., that the classification serves “important government 
objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related 
to the achievement of those objectives”).162  Two EPC analytical frameworks 
might be used to establish a violation of a right to equal employment 
opportunity when an employer strictly adheres to workplace norms that 
maintain family-wage barriers or takes other adverse employment action against 
caregivers.  The first is a claim for employment discrimination in violation of the 
EPC.  The second is a direct challenge to a state policy that maintains family-
wage barriers. 
a. A Theory of Employment Discrimination Based on Caregiver 
Status 
One way to challenge the sex discrimination that results from family-wage 
barriers is through a claim of employment discrimination in violation of the 
EPC.163  In the absence of direct evidence of intent, EPC employment 
discrimination claims are analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas three-prong 
burden-shifting framework.164   However, courts and scholars have criticized the 
McDonnell Douglas framework as overly cumbersome and “actually invit[ing] 
juries and courts to lose sight of the ultimate issue in an employment 
discrimination case.”165  This framework encourages a piecemeal approach to 
assessing evidence and prevents a fact finder from considering everything before 
deciding whether it is more likely than not that the employer was motivated, at 
least in part, by a discriminatory animus.166 
The inadequacies of McDonnell Douglas, and the way in which it limits full 
and fair protection of the rights guaranteed by the EPC, are apparent in a 
 
 162. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 513, 533 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 163. This article focuses on fundamental rights violations of caregivers due to discriminatory 
work structures based on the family-wage ideal. Title VII may be an additional source for a cause of 
action based on the failure to accommodate caregiving responsibilities. However, without evidence 
that a similarly situated male employee was granted a caregiving accommodation, courts have been 
reluctant to entertain such claims. See, e.g., Fralin v. C & D Sec., Inc., No. 06-2421, 2007 WL 1576464, at 
*6–8 (E.D. Pa. May 30, 2007) (stating that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on 
“child rearing” because child rearing is a gender neutral trait); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. 
Supp. 1487, 1492 (D. Colo. 1997). See also Albiston, supra note 28, at 1154–55 (agreeing that Title VII 
offers limited protection for those who need accommodations). 
 164. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). The first prong of McDonnell 
Douglas requires the plaintiff to set forth a prima facie case by establishing (a) she belongs to a 
protected class, (b) she is qualified for the position that she held, (c) she suffered an adverse 
employment action, and (d) the adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of 
discrimination. If a plaintiff sets forth the prima facie case, a presumption of intentional 
discrimination arises. Id. at 802. Under the second prong of McDonnell Douglas, the defendant must 
articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the action. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Under the final prong of McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must 
establish that the defendant’s proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
 165. Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for 
Assessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 671 (1998) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). 
 166. Id. at 675 n.82. 
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challenge to an adverse employment action based on caregiver status.167 
Although such a case presents an issue of sex equality that denies women—at 
least those who conform to the stereotype of the group—employment 
opportunities equal to men, the rigidity of McDonnell Douglas makes it difficult 
for a plaintiff to meet even the first two elements of a prima facie case.  A prima 
facie McDonnell Douglas case requires the plaintiff to establish that she is in a 
protected class.168  In these cases, a court might characterize the plaintiff’s class as 
a caregiver, rather than as a woman, despite the fact that caregivers are, 
statistically, a subset of women.169  “Caregiver” has not been identified as a 
protected class.170   Nor should it need to be for a claim based on caregiver status; 
the already-recognized protected class of sex should be sufficient to satisfy this 
prong.171  
The second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is also an 
obstacle in fully and fairly adjudicating claims based on family-wage barriers.  
The second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is whether the 
plaintiff is qualified for the job.  Courts have been persuaded by the argument 
that a plaintiff is not qualified for the job if she cannot conform to the workplace 
structure (developed around a male breadwinner-female caregiver ideal).172  By 
imposing such a requirement, courts hold  plaintiffs to the very standards they 
allege are discriminatory.  Ultimately, the McDonnell Douglas framework allows 
legitimate violations of women’s rights to equal employment opportunity to 
persist. 
When the Court first announced the analytical framework in McDonnell 
Douglas, it acknowledged that the framework might need modification to 
accommodate different employment discrimination contexts.173  Without losing 
sight of the plaintiff’s ultimate burden in an employment discrimination case, 
and using McDonnell Douglas as a guideline and starting point,174 this article 
 
 167. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 168. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254. 
 169. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 170. Walsh, 332 F.3d at 1160. 
 171. Id. (finding that the discrimination was based on pregnancy and that the plaintiff’s ability to 
become pregnant, as a woman, was sufficient to support a claim of gender discrimination). 
 172. Pregnancy discrimination cases, in particular, have been unsuccessful for this reason. See 
Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 34–35 (2009); see also Lacoparra 
v. Pergament Home Ctrs., 982 F. Supp. 213, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (attempting to characterize pregnancy 
as a disability warranting discrimination protection). Within the male breadwinner-female caregiver 
norm, the court inquired: “the question is whether the [pregnancy] complication itself (i.e., the 
‘impairment,’ or physiological disorder) is substantial enough to qualify as a ‘disability . . . .’” Id. 
 173. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973). See also Furnco Constr. 
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas standard was “never 
intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic”). Furthermore, some courts of appeals interpreted the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100–102 (2003) as modifying the 
final prong of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, even though the Court did not expressly state so. See 
White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 398–402 (6th Cir. 2008) (discussing the various ways 
in which circuit courts have interpreted Desert Palace’s effect on the McDonnell Douglas framework). 
 174. Indeed, the Court has recognized that “[t]he importance of McDonnell Douglas lies, not in its 
specification of the discrete elements of proof there required, but in its recognition of the general 
principle that any [] plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an 
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proposes a modified framework for analyzing a claim for discrimination based 
on caregiver status.  This proposal draws from the framework that courts use to 
analyze claims for a failure to accommodate disabilities under the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).175  Under the proposed framework, the plaintiff 
would have to show that (1) she has caregiving responsibilities, (2) she suffered 
an adverse employment action because of her caregiving responsibilities, and (3) 
she is able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a 
reasonable alternative work arrangement (“AWA”).176  A defendant would then 
have the opportunity to show that all alternatives were unduly burdensome (if 
relevant), the reason for the adverse action was not based on plaintiff’s caregiver 
status and not negated by an AWA, or an inference of sex discrimination from 
action based on caregiving responsibilities is absent.177 
This proposed framework alleviates two obstacles imposed by the 
McDonnell Douglas framework that prevent a court from substantively 
addressing the EPC violations resulting from family-wage barriers. First, this 
framework presumes that adverse actions against people with caregiving 
responsibilities constitute actions based on sex.  Statistically and socially, as 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Hibbs and supported by the statistics cited 
above,178 caregivers are a subset of women.179  This caregiver subset, as discussed 
by Joan C. Williams and Nancy Segal, is more susceptible and vulnerable to sex 
role stereotypes and more likely to be discriminated against than women 
generally.180  Therefore, adverse actions based on caregiver status should be 
considered presumptively based on gender for purposes of addressing these 
claims.  A presumption that caregiver status discrimination is discrimination 
based on gender avoids protracted litigation about whether the plaintiff is a 
member of a protected class and the necessity for courts to determine what level 
of scrutiny a new class would receive.  Nevertheless, under the framework, the 
presumption is rebuttable; the burden is on the party with the best access to 
statistics and data showing that patterns in a particular place of employment are 
 
inference that an employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion . . . .” Int’l. Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (1977). Courts have been amenable to departing from the 
strict “mixed motive” or McDonnell Douglas framework. See Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 45–46. 
 175. Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991). 
 176. This proposed framework incorporates several elements of the McDonnell Douglas prima 
facie case: that the plaintiff is in a protected class, she suffered an adverse action, and is qualified for 
the position. Borrowing from the reasonable disability accommodations context, this framework 
defines “qualified” with reference to an AWA. See, e.g., Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 
F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (requiring a plaintiff alleging an ADA claim for failure to accommodate to 
show (1) she was or is disabled, (2) the defendant is aware of the disability, and (3) she satisfies the 
prerequisites of the position and can perform the essential functions of the job either with or without 
a reasonable accommodation). 
 177. Mindful of the fact that the Supreme Court would be reluctant to depart from the McDonnell 
Douglas framework, this proposed framework is a compromise meant to efficiently address the 
ultimate issues relevant to this claim, not an ideal framework for plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination claims. 
 178. See supra Section II. 
 179. To the extent that male caregivers might pursue these claims, the adverse action is also based 
on sex because it is based on the male assuming the stereotypical role of a woman. 
 180. Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 80. 
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inconsistent with the broader social reality.181 
Placing this burden on the defendant dilutes the importance of a 
comparator to the plaintiff’s case.182  Courts sometimes rely too heavily on 
comparator evidence, the absence of which creates a negative inference for the 
plaintiff.183   Relying on a comparator in the context of a caregiver case ignores 
the reality that male caregivers are rare.  If a male caregiver comparator is 
present and treated similarly as the plaintiff, relying on the comparator ignores 
the likely possibility that the negative treatment was due to the male caregiver 
not conforming to sex role stereotypes, and, therefore, based on sex and 
actionable under a sex-stereotyping theory.184 
Additionally, the proposed framework eliminates a second fundamental 
problem of McDonnell Douglas, which defines whether a woman is qualified 
based on her ability to conform to an inherently discriminatory work structure.185 
Instead, this framework mirrors ADA accommodations jurisprudence by 
allowing the caregiver to demonstrate that she is qualified for the position if an 
AWA is made.186  A defendant, in turn, cannot simply say that the plaintiff was 
unqualified for the position because of her inability to conform to the workplace 
structure. 
b. Application of the Modified Framework 
Satisfying the first element of the plaintiff’s case should be relatively easy 
for the plaintiff to accomplish; she need only demonstrate that she has caregiving 
responsibilities.187  Nevertheless, this first element is a necessary component of 
an EPC gender discrimination claim because it links the challenged action to the 
basis of a protected class: sex.188  To argue that caregivers are a subset of women, 
advocates should rely on Hibbs and statistics establishing that caregivers are a 
 
 181. See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118–22 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 182. See id. (stating that stereotyping about the qualities of mothers is a form of sex discrimination 
and can be determined without reference to father comparators); Tingley-Kelley v. Trustees of Univ. 
of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (holding that no comparator is necessary to determine 
whether a woman was discriminated against based on her caregiver status, stating “the ultimate 
issue in any discrimination case is whether the plaintiff, as an individual, is discriminated against” and 
recognizing the difficulty that a plaintiff might have in obtaining evidence of how similarly situated 
men were treated). 
 183. For a brief discussion on problems with the comparator analysis, see Grossman & Thomas, 
supra note 172, at 34–35. In any event, the proper comparison would be men and single women 
without caregiving responsibilities. Men are not presumed to have caregiving responsibilities that 
might interfere with their jobs. Single women without caregiving responsibilities are viewed by 
employers to be like the ideal male breadwinner and are treated better than women with caregiving 
responsibilities. 
 184. Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 1996) 
(inferring no evidence of discrimination based on the lack of evidence that married men or men with 
children were treated differently). 
 185. See Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 93–94 (discussing the ways in which women and 
caregivers have difficulty conforming to the male-designed workplace). 
 186. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 187. See id. (stating that, in order for a plaintiff to bring an ADA claim, an individual must prove 
he or she is disabled). 
 188. Tingley-Kelley v. Trustees of Univ. of Pa., 677 F. Supp. 2d 764, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2010) 
(recognizing that stereotypes based on mothers are linked to the protected gender class). 
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subset of women.  As discussed above, in upholding the FMLA as a proper 
exercise of Congress’ power to remedy gender discrimination, the Court 
acknowledged that because women are society’s primary caregivers, 
discrimination against caregivers disproportionately affects women.189  Hibbs laid 
a foundation for courts to recognize that discrimination based on caregiver status 
is discrimination based on gender. 
The second prong that a plaintiff would have to demonstrate under the 
proposed framework is the existence of an adverse employment action.  An 
adverse employment action produces a “material employment disadvantage.”190 
“Termination, cuts in pay or benefits, and changes that affect an employee’s 
future career prospects are significant enough to meet the standard . . . as would 
circumstances amounting to a constructive discharge.”191  The creation of a 
hostile environment might also constitute or result in an adverse action and is an 
actionable claim.192 
Consider Shireen Walsh, a “top performer” in her job as a customer service 
account representative who prevailed on her constructive discharge, hostile 
environment, and retaliation claims against her employer.193  After returning 
from maternity leave following the birth of her son, Walsh immediately 
experienced hostility from her supervisor.194   The Eighth Circuit’s summary of 
the facts developed in the district court evidence disparate treatment and 
harassment based on caregiver status.  An example of disparate treatment 
included an instance when, “as a reward for having covered Walsh’s workload 
while she was on leave,” Walsh’s coworkers got the afternoon off, “but Walsh 
was told to stay in the office and watch the phones.”195  Additionally, the Eighth 
Circuit noted that “[w]hen Walsh asked if she could change her schedule to leave 
work at 4:30 p.m. instead of 5:00 because her son’s daycare closed at 5:00, 
[Walsh’s boss] told Walsh that her territory needed coverage until 5:00 and that 
‘maybe she should look for another job.’’’196  
This contrasted with treatment of “[o]ther account representatives [who] left 
work at 3:45 on a regular basis.”197  Further, Walsh’s boss “testified at trial that 
Walsh’s territory did not need to be covered through 5:00.”198  Additionally, 
Walsh had to  “make up ‘every minute’ that she spent away from the office for 
doctors appointments for herself or her son and time spent caring for her son.  
No other employee was required to make up work for time missed due to 
 
 189. See Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (acknowledging 
that caretaking responsibilities often fall to women, impacting the lives of working women more than 
the lives of working men). 
 190. Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
 191. Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1016 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 192. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986). 
 193. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1159–61 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 194. Id. at 1154. 
 195. Id. at 1155. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
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appointments and other personal matters.”199 
The Eighth Circuit’s summary also included examples of harassment based 
on caregiver status: “[w]hen Walsh was showing co-workers pictures of her son 
on her first day back to work, [Walsh’s boss] told her to stop disrupting the office 
and to get back to work.”200  Walsh’s boss also “attached signs (‘Out—Sick 
Child’) to Walsh’s cubicle when Walsh had to care for her son.”201  The Eighth 
Circuit noted that “notes typically were not placed on other absent employees’ 
cubicles.”202 Further examples of harassment included the boss’s reference “to 
Walsh’s son as ‘the sickling’’’ and her demand that Walsh “find a pediatrician 
who was open after hours” after “thr[owing] a phone book on Walsh’s desk.”203  
And “[w]hen Walsh told [her boss] she needed to pick her son up from daycare 
because he was ill, [her boss] replied, ‘Is this an April Fool’s joke? If so, it’s not at 
all funny.’”204  As a result of the stress, Walsh fainted at work and was brought to 
the hospital.  “The next day, [Walsh’s boss] stopped at Walsh’s cubicle and told 
her, ‘you better not be pregnant again.’’’205  Walsh attempted to find a solution 
for the tension between her and the supervisor, but eventually quit her job.206 
The defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied, 
demonstrating that the district court believed that the facts, if viewed in favor of 
the plaintiff, could support liability based on several theories.207  Ultimately, the 
jury found in favor of Walsh on the charges of constructive discharge, retaliation, 
pregnancy discrimination, and hostile environment.208  On appeal to the Eighth 
Circuit, the jury’s verdict was affirmed based on the evidence supporting 
pregnancy discrimination on a hostile environment theory.  The circuit court 
held that Walsh’s potential to become pregnant meant that she fell within the 
protection afforded by the statute.209  The circuit did not address whether the 
evidence supported a cause of action based on Walsh’s status as a caregiver.  By 
avoiding the discrimination against Walsh that was based on her caregiver 
status, the precedent falls short of establishing that discrimination against 
caregivers is discrimination against women in violation of federal statute, despite 
the circuit’s opportunity to acknowledge such. 
Although the Eighth Circuit ultimately avoided the issue of whether 
Walsh’s caregiver status could support liability under Title VII, Walsh’s case 
demonstrates the several types of adverse actions that women with caregiving 
responsibilities might be subjected to, including hostile environment and 
constructive discharge.  The examples of discrimination discussed in Section 
IV(B), such as Joann Trezza,210 who was passed over for a promotion, or Patricia 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 1154–55. 
 201. Id. at 1155. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 1154–55. 
 206. Id. at 1155–56. 
 207. Id. at 1156. 
 208. See id. at 1158–61. 
 209. Id. at 1160. 
 210. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 
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Leahy, who was terminated, highlight additional adverse actions that employers 
might take based on a woman’s status as caregiver.211   
In addition, a plaintiff like Walsh who requests and is denied a reasonable 
AWA might suffer an adverse employment action on that basis alone.  If a 
plaintiff can establish the first and third elements of the proposed framework—
that she has caregiving responsibilities and is qualified for the job, with or 
without an AWA—she might pursue a claim based on the employer’s failure to 
give an AWA for caregiving responsibilities.  An AWA is a change in the work 
structure that would allow a caregiver to do her job without sacrificing her 
responsibilities as worker or caregiver.212  An employer’s failure to grant an 
AWA for caregiving responsibilities can cause a “material employment 
disadvantage,”213 constituting an adverse employment action. 214  It can mean 
that a woman is excluded altogether from employment or forced to forgo 
advancement opportunities.215 
Recognizing a claim based on the failure to give an AWA would not require 
the court to recognize an entirely new adverse employment action.216 Adverse 
actions based on a failure to make reasonable accommodations in the disability 
and religious discrimination contexts are firmly recognized by precedent.217  In 
those contexts, statutes—the ADA and Title VII—make it an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer not to make reasonable accommodations, 
short of undue hardship, for the disabilities or religious practices of its 
employees.218  In creating a cause of action based on the failure to accommodate, 
Congress implicitly recognized a need to change the work structure to fully 
realize the guarantees of the EPC to be free from discrimination on the basis of 
disability or religion.219  At least one court has held, in the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act, that childcare leave is a potential accommodation because it 
 
30, 1998). 
 211. Leahy v. Gap, Inc., No. 07-2008, 2008 WL 2946007, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008). 
 212. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (stating that, under 
the ADA, employers are required to make “reasonable accommodations to disabled employees”). 
 213. Cross v. Cleaver, 142 F.3d 1059, 1073 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 214. See id. at 1073 (stating that employers would be liable for retaliatory actions characterized as 
“material employment disadvantages”). 
 215. See, e.g., Leahy, 2008 WL 2946007, at *5; Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at* 4. 
 216. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d 6 at 20. 
 217. See id.; Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 218. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(5) (1990) (defining discrimination as 
“not making reasonable accommodations” in the absence of undue hardship); Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A. 
2000e(j) (1991) (making it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of religion and defining religion to 
include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate” a religious observance “without undue 
hardship”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 72 (1977) (opining that the intent and 
effect of the definition of “religion” was to make it an unlawful employment practice for an employer 
not to make reasonable accommodation, short of undue hardship). 
 219. But see Holmes v. Marion Co. Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914, 921–922 (7th Cir. 
2003) (holding that the defendant was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because the 
religious accommodations provision of Title VII was enacted pursuant to Congress’ power under the 
Commerce Clause, not the EPC, and, thus cannot be used to compel a state to accommodate religious 
practices). 
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permits the plaintiff to lead a normal life.220 Greater protections are afforded for 
sex than for disability,221 so courts should be receptive to the argument that a 
failure to give an AWA constitutes an adverse employment action in the gender 
discrimination context. 
Although courts should be reminded that greater constitutional protections 
are afforded to women than people with disabilities, reference to the ADA 
framework might make a court more apt to recognize a claim based on a failure 
to grant an AWA.  If the court refers to the ADA accommodation analysis, the 
plaintiff’s request for a proposed reasonable alternative would trigger an 
employer’s duty to provide an AWA, and the plaintiff would have to show that 
she requested an AWA to establish an adverse employment action.222  If a 
plaintiff would be able to perform her job with an AWA and does not receive 
one, an employer who does not engage in an interactive process to provide an 
AWA should be held liable for failing to engage in the interactive process, as well 
as the failure to provide an AWA.223 
ADA jurisprudence provides guidance on what types of accommodations 
are reasonable in the employment context.224  Under the ADA, “[t]he employer 
must be willing to consider making changes in its ordinary work rules, facilities, 
terms, and conditions in order to enable a disabled individual to work.”225 
Reasonable accommodations may include “job restructuring, part-time or 
modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position . . . and other similar 
accommodations.”226 
 
 220. McWright v. Alexander, 982 F.2d 222, 227 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 221. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735–36 (2003) (applying rational basis 
review to disability discrimination). 
 222. See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 102–103 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding 
that plaintiff’s ADA claim failed in part because the duty to accommodate was not triggered); Calero-
Cerezo, 355 F.3d 6 at 24 (denying summary judgment  to defendant on plaintiff’s ADA claim because 
the plaintiff requested an accommodation and triggered the duty to accommodate). 
 223. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(o)(3) (2011); Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 218–19 
(2d Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 174 F.3d 142, 157 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 224. Precedent interpreting the ADA obligation to accommodate is more amenable to plaintiffs’ 
positions than precedent interpreting the Title VII’s obligation to accommodate religious practice, 
and is more firmly rooted in the EPC. In a Title VII religious accommodations case, the employee 
must establish a prima facie case by proving that (1) she has a bona fide religious belief, the practice 
of which conflicted with an employment duty, (2) she informed the employer of the belief and 
conflict, and (3) the employer threatened her with or subjected her to discriminatory treatment, 
including discharge, because of her inability to fulfill the job requirements. Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 
F.3d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993). Although an employer has an obligation to make a good faith effort to 
accommodate a religious practice, any reasonable accommodation fulfills this obligation. Ansonia Bd. 
Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986). Furthermore, undue hardship to the employer results when 
the religious practices accommodation results in “more than a de minimus cost” to the employer. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977). See also Johnson v. Siemens Bldg. 
Technologies, No. 05 C. 3836, 2007 WL. 1017850, at *19–20 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2007) (analyzing a failure 
to accommodate caregiving responsibilities using the ADA’s framework). 
 225. Vande Zande v. State of Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 226. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(9)(B) (1990); Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 
602 F.3d 495, 505–06 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that changing an employee’s shift from nighttime to 
daytime because the employee could not commute to work at night due to blindness in one eye was a 
reasonable accommodation); Langon v. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 1060–61 
(D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that working from home is a reasonable accommodation under the 
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Although the analysis is fact-intensive, in light of the accommodations 
deemed “reasonable” in ADA cases, the statistics and stories discussed 
throughout this article make it  easy to imagine the AWAs that a caregiver can 
request.227  Alternatives to work structures might include any of the following:   
1) a set work schedule for an hourly employee who must plan child care in 
advance, 2) a shifted schedule that allows for the caregiver to either come in to 
work later or leave earlier while still working a full day, 3) a part-time schedule, 
or 4) allowance to work from home a few days per week.  Workers might also 
have the option to take time off for emergency caregiving needs, with the 
promise to make up this time later.  Fully realizing the EPC right to be free from 
gender discrimination in the workplace requires changes to the work structure. 
Without the court’s recognition of an EPC claim based solely on the failure to 
grant AWAs, employment discrimination against women in its most subtle 
forms will persist. 
An employee might also have a claim for constructive discharge if she quit 
her job, like Shireen Walsh did, as a result of the type of adverse actions just 
described.228  Constructive discharge is another type of an adverse employment 
action.229  “[T]he purpose of the constructive discharge doctrine [is] to protect 
employees from conditions so unreasonably harsh that a reasonable person 
would feel compelled to leave the job.”230  This doctrine remedies a situation in 
which “an employer . . . subjectively desires an employee to remain, so long as 
the employee is willing to accept unreasonable, oppressive conditions.”231  To 
establish a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a 
reasonable person would have found the conditions of employment 
intolerable.232 An employee who “quits without giving [her] employer a 
reasonable chance to work out a problem” is not constructively discharged.233  A 
minority of circuit courts also require that the employer intended to force the 
employee to resign.234 
 
Rehabilitation Act). 
 227. See Sections II, IV. 
 228. See Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 229. Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 148 (2004). 
 230. Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000)); Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d at 732, n.4 (citing cases indicating that 
the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and D.C. Circuits do not require proof of an employer’s 
subjective intent; the Second and Fourth Circuits require proof of employer intent); but see Sanchez v. 
Denver Pub. Sch., 164 F.3d 527, 534 (10th Cir. 1998); Gartman v. Gencorp Inc., 120 F.3d 127, 130 (8th 
Cir. 1997) (requiring an employee to show employer’s intent to force employee to quit); 
Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 718 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying an objective standard); 
Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp, 796 F.2d 340, 344 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that “proof of constructive discharge 
depends upon whether a reasonable [person] would view the working conditions as intolerable”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 233. Brenneman v. Famous Dave’s of America, Inc., 507 F.3d 1139, 1144 (8th Cir. 2007) . 
 234. See Trierweiler v. Wells Fargo Bank, 639 F.3d 456, 459–61 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a grant of 
summary judgment for defendant where plaintiff, who alleged pregnancy discrimination on the basis 
of a constructive discharge, failed to meet the “substantial burden” to show that the conditions were 
intolerable or that the employer intended to force her to quit); Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 
92 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1996); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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A variety of employment actions might give rise to a constructive discharge 
claim; the inquiry is case-specific.235  One court held that a jury could conclude 
that a change in cubicle location, work title, duties, and a requirement to work on 
vacation time were factors that could make a workplace intolerable to a 
reasonable person.236  Similarly, reassignment from a lucrative sales territory 
with the option to accept reassignment or resign is considered a constructive 
discharge.237  At least two circuits recognize that a complete failure to 
accommodate a disability, in the face of repeated requests, evidences the 
deliberateness necessary for a constructive discharge.238  Because sex 
discrimination triggers greater constitutional protection than disability 
discrimination,239 a similar holding should be reached in the context of a woman 
who quits her job because of an employer’s failure to grant an AWA, or a hostile 
environment based on caregiver status. 
The adverse actions described above make working conditions intolerable. 
For example, the harassment and disparate treatment endured by Shireen Walsh 
forced her to leave her job.240  The lack of an AWA for Devorah Gartner, 
described below, required her to quit.241  For these women, the treatment is akin 
to a mandatory discharge policy.242  Poor women are punished because they are 
threatened with destitution; an inability to fit caregiving responsibilities into the 
family-wage work structure can mean that they are forced to quit their jobs, or 
work insufficient hours to support themselves and their families.  Wealthier 
women, who might not need to work in order to support their families, are 
adversely affected because this treatment reinforces societal pressure to 
relinquish career aspirations. 
The final element that a plaintiff must demonstrate to meet her burden of 
production under the proposed framework is that she is qualified for the 
position, with an AWA if she needs one, or without an AWA if she does not.243  
 
 235. Carter v. Town of Benton, 827 F.2d 700, 705  (W.D. La. 2010) (denying defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment on plaintiff’s parallel Title VII and Section 1983 claims, which alleged that she 
was constructively discharged when given the option to quit or be fired after complaining about 
sexual harassment). 
 236. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d at 731–32. 
 237. Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., Co., 747 F.2d 885, 888–89 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 238. Compare Crabhill v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 423 Fed. Appx. 314, 324 (4th Cir. 
2011), with Trierweiler, 639 F.3d at 460 (leaving open  the possibility that a failure to accommodate 
could suffice as evidence of constructive discharge, but holding that evidence of an intent to provide 
an accommodation undermined a constructive discharge claim where the plaintiff needs to prove 
employer’s intent to force her to quit), and Talley v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 542 F.3d 1099, 
1109 (6th Cir. 2008) (joining the Fourth Circuit in recognizing that a jury may conclude that an 
employee’s resignation was both intended and foreseeable when an employee makes a repeated 
request for an accommodation and that request is denied and no reasonable alternative is offered). 
 239. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (iterating that courts 
review cases of gender discrimination using an “intermediate scrutiny” standard), with Bd. of Trs. of 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001) (applying a rational basis standard of review to 
allegations of constitutional violations on the basis of disability). 
 240. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 241. LERNER, supra note 9, at 13. 
 242. See Ramos v. Davis & Geck, Inc., 167 F.3d 727, 732 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 243. See Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 22 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing the 
plaintiff’s requirement to show she is qualified for the position in question). 
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Unlike the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework, by defining whether a 
woman is qualified with reference to how she can perform the job if given a 
needed AWA, the proposed framework allows a plaintiff to demonstrate that she 
meets essential job functions without reference to an inherently discriminatory 
workplace structure. A defendant cannot defeat this claim by arguing that an 
employee is not qualified for a job because of her inability to meet job 
requirements that would not exist if she was granted an AWA.  Under this 
analysis, conditions such as an employee’s inability to put in “face time” at the 
office, the need for a set weekly schedule, or the need for an emergency leave 
allowance will not generally be considered to undermine “essential job 
functions.”244  Plaintiffs should focus on the specific job functions and duties to 
argue that the employee can meet those requirements, even with minor 
modifications to the traditional work structure of the place of employment.  
Plaintiffs can argue, as highlighted above, that defining whether a woman is 
“qualified” by referring to her ability to meet the essential jobs functions, rather 
than whether she can conform to an outdated work structure, is more consistent 
with EPC jurisprudence that seeks to eliminate sex-role stereotypes.245  
Under this proposed framework, the defendant would have the opportunity 
to demonstrate one of three defenses to defeat the plaintiff’s claim: 1) the 
employee was not qualified, even with an AWA, or no reasonable AWA existed; 
2) the adverse action was not based on caregiver status; or 3) the inference of 
discrimination is absent.246  The first of these defenses borrows directly from 
analysis of the reasonableness of an ADA accommodation, in which the 
employer must show that any accommodation for a disability imposes an undue 
hardship.247  An accommodation that creates only “some difficulty” for an 
employer does not impose an undue burden.248  Under the ADA, an employer is 
not required to create a new position for the plaintiff or reallocate essential job 
functions,249 but advocates might argue that the greater protection afforded to 
sex classifications warrants types of AWAs not necessarily required by the ADA 
to eliminate family-wage barriers.  At most, only “some difficulty” results from 
 
 244. See id. at 23 (confirming that if an accommodation is reasonable and feasible an employer 
should make the accommodation). 
 245. See Ginsburg, supra note 38, at 268–70 (arguing that defining whether an employee is 
qualified with reference to an available AWA does not fully remedy the problems posed by a 
discriminatory workplace, but it acknowledges that the work structure is itself discriminatory and 
has been accepted by the courts as a way to analyze whether a plaintiff is qualified in the disability 
context). 
 246. See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 23. 
 247. Id. 
 248. See Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that an 
accommodation that creates only “some difficulty” for an employer does not impose an undue 
burden); Heaser v. Toro Co., 247 F.3d 826, 832 (8th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor 
of defendant, holding that the employer was not required to make an overall change in the way it 
conducted business to accommodate plaintiff and finding that plaintiff could not perform the 
essential functions of her job from home); Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 
1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding that an employer is not required to create a new position or reallocate 
essential functions of a job). 
 249. Heaser, 247 F.3d at 832. 
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restructuring work to accommodate caregiving responsibilities.250 
An employer may also defeat a claim by showing that the adverse action 
was not based on caregiver status; this is analogous to an employer’s 
opportunity in any discrimination claim to demonstrate that the adverse action 
was not based on the employee’s membership in a protected class.251  Here, 
however, an employer cannot defeat a claim simply by highlighting another 
basis for the adverse action if that basis is negated by the implementation of an 
AWA.252  For example, if the employer claims that the adverse action occurred 
because the woman leaves early, that justification would be insufficient if the 
employee completed all assignments on time and leaving early does not harm 
the employer.  If the stated reason for termination is repeated tardiness to a 
morning shift because a woman needs to drop her child off at school, and 
moving the shift a half hour later is an alternative to the adverse action, an 
employer cannot defeat the action by offering tardiness as a non-discriminatory 
reason for the action.  If, on the other hand, such an alternative was offered or 
implemented and the woman was still late to her shift, tardiness constitutes a 
non-discriminatory reason. 
Finally, an employer can defeat a claim by challenging the presumption that 
caregiver status is a proxy for gender.253  A defendant would most likely seek to 
do so by comparing how the plaintiff was treated with how other employees 
were treated.  Statistics might also demonstrate that the defendant’s workplace 
does not conform to average workplaces in regards to retention of women and 
women who hold upper level positions.  When making comparisons to defeat 
the presumption of caregiver status as a proxy for gender, courts and advocates 
should make comparisons between men and women workers that include the 
retention rates, the reasons why women leave verses why men leave, the rates of 
promotions, and the gender and caretaking status of those holding the higher 
level positions to determine if there is a pattern at the particular workplace 
consistent with the broader society.  These comparisons should help account for 
the state of equality between the genders at the place of employment in order to 
undermine the presumption that the discrimination based on caregiver status 
was based on gender.  To that extent, the inquiry is more nuanced than a 
comparator analysis. An employer should not be able to simply point to one 
male caregiver who suffered an adverse action, when that male caregiver was an 
anomaly.  This is particularly true because the male caregiver might have been 
discriminated against based on his non-conformance to sex-role stereotypes.  If 
so, the discrimination is still based on sex.  Indeed, the proper comparison would 
be a man or a woman with no caregiving responsibilities—workers who conform 
to the ideal male breadwinner model. 
 
 250. See Freadman, 484 F.3d at 103. 
 251. See Bass v. Chem. Banking Corp., No. 94 Civ. 8833, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 
1996) (holding that the employer successfully showed that the plaintiff was not treated differently 
than others in her class). 
 252. See generally, Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (analyzing 
whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the plaintiff was qualified for the position and 
examining whether she could perform her essential job functions with or without an 
accommodation). 
 253. See Bass, 1996 WL 374151, at *5 (denying that caregiver status is a proxy for gender). 
Maxwell Paginated Proof (Do Not Delete) 12/13/2012 10:10 AM 
 LEVERAGING THE COURTS TO PROTECT WOMEN’S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 157 
An employment discrimination claim for a violation of the EPC due to 
adverse actions because of caregiving status would require the court to recognize 
that caregiver status is presumptively a class based on gender.254  Since the 
current analytical framework used for employment discrimination allows 
violations of the EPC to go unchallenged,255 the court should adopt a new 
framework that fully protects these rights.  In some cases, the claim will require 
the court to recognize  that a failure to grant an AWA is an adverse employment 
action.  Nevertheless, this claim follows from rights guaranteed by the EPC, 
which provides the constitutional foundation for Title VII, the FMLA, and the 
ADA, including those statutes’ provisions for claims based on failures to 
accommodate in the disability and religious contexts. 
c. A Challenge to Irrational State Policy that Maintains Family-Wage 
Barriers 
A direct challenge to an irrational state policy or action that maintains 
family-wage barriers might arise if a state has a policy not to offer AWAs to 
people with caregiving responsibilities, or penalizes individuals for working 
with an AWA. For example, the female police officers in Prater v. Detroit Police 
Department alleged that they were forced to take sick leave while pregnant, 
regardless of whether they could perform their job functions.256  The police 
department determined promotions based in part on the use of sick leave; so the 
mandatory sick leave for pregnancy detrimentally affected their career 
advancement.257  A parallel policy that indirectly penalizes people who, for 
example, use their sick days or telecommute, should be challenged as a violation 
of the EPC, because these policies result in disparate treatment of the caregivers 
who are most likely to take advantage of the policies. 
Work assignment procedures also might disproportionately and negatively 
impact caregivers.  Consider Deanna Tipler, a correctional officer who was 
reassigned to a work shift that caused her to spend less time with her children 
and more money on childcare.258  The employer reassigned Tipler pursuant to a 
procedure accounting for the numbers of men and women on each shift, 
seniority, and employee preference.259  The court ultimately held that the 
procedure did not violate Title VII or the EPC.  The court noted that pursuant to 
Eighth Circuit precedent, a policy of staffing female-only wards only with female 
guards is reasonable.  Based on that precedent, the circuit concluded that the 
County’s shift reassignment policy was reasonable to adequately staff female 
wards, even though the prison allowed male guards to cover for female guards 
when they took breaks.  Because Tipler “showed only that her reassignment 
caused her some personal inconvenience and expense” and “[a]ny restriction on 
 
 254. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 172, at 34–35. 
 255. Although Title VII might allow some claims to succeed, the violations that go unchallenged 
are where  family-wage barriers prevent women from doing their jobs. 
 256. Prater v. Detroit Police Dep’t, No. 08-14339, 2009 WL 4576039 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009). 
 257. CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, FAMILY RESPONSIBILITY DISCRIMINATION: LITIGATION UPDATE 
2010, 13–14. 
 258. Tipler v. Douglas Cnty., Neb., 483 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir. 2007). 
 259. Id. 
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Tipler’s employment was minimal,” the court affirmed dismissal of the claim.260  
As Tipler’s situation demonstrates, policies that do not account for caregiving 
responsibilities of workers adversely affect women more than men. These 
policies should be challenged as violations of the EPC. 
The Supreme Court uses a two-prong analysis when determining whether a 
facially neutral state policy violates the EPC’s guarantee to be free from gender 
discrimination.261  The Court first determines if the policy is “neutral in the sense 
that it is not gender based.”262  If the classification is not based on gender, the 
second step is to determine whether the “adverse effect reflects invidious gender-
based discrimination.”263  However, a state policy or action with adverse effects 
is only unconstitutional under the EPC if the discriminatory impact can be traced 
to a discriminatory purpose.264 
Although a policy against offering AWAs for caregivers or penalizing those 
who work under arrangements more likely to be used by caregivers might be 
couched as inherently non-neutral because caregivers are a subset of women, it is 
difficult to predict how a court might receive this argument.265  The Court 
rejected a similar argument in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.266 
Feeney involved a gender discrimination challenge to a state statute granting an 
absolute lifetime preference to veterans.267  The Court concluded that the statute 
was facially neutral because, although only two percent of women were veterans, 
the statute’s preference for veterans disadvantaged male and female nonveterans 
alike.268  Similarly, a policy against AWAs or a policy that penalizes employees 
for using AWAs disfavors male and female caregivers equally. 
Assuming that the Court will view such policies as facially neutral, a 
plaintiff must establish discriminatory purpose or intent.269  Discriminatory 
intent is the selection or pursuit of a course of action at least in part because of 
the adverse effect on a particular group.270  The disproportionate impact on a 
particular group can be a starting point towards the evidence demonstrating a 
discriminatory intent.271  Additional evidence might be gleaned from the 
historical background of an employment decision and the procedural or 
 
 260. Id. at 1027–28. 
 261. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (explaining that if the policy is 
not facially neutral, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and  must be substantially related to an 
important government interest and must not intentionally discriminate against women). 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 272. 
 265. See, e.g., id. at 275 (explaining that although a law favoring veteran status primarily benefits 
men, the nonveterans disadvantaged by the law are men and women so the law is not grounded in a 
gender-based classification). 
 266. See id. (rejecting the argument that laws favoring primarily male veterans classify based on 
gender). 
 267. Id. at 259. 
 268. Id. at 275. 
 269. Id. at 274. 
 270. Id. at 279. 
 271. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 563 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that 
analyzing a facially neutral policy for race discrimination begins with a study of the impact of the 
policy on different racial groups). 
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substantive departures from the employer’s normal practices.272  To bolster her 
claim, a plaintiff might highlight the development of the family-wage ideal as a 
response to the shift of productive activity from the home to workplaces outside 
of the home, establishing that the nature of work has been socially constructed to 
exclude people with caregiving responsibilities.  Using the evidence provided in 
this article and its references, a plaintiff could establish that the majority of 
people with caregiving responsibilities are women.  Furthermore, supervisors’ or 
managers’ remarks based on stereotypes about working women and 
motherhood could provide direct evidence of discriminatory intent.  For 
example, one plaintiff alleging an EPC violation for a discriminatory firing was 
told that her job as a school administrator “was perhaps not the job or the school 
district for her if she had ‘little ones,’ and that it was ‘not possible for [her] to be a 
good mother and have this job.’”273  These types of comments might be present in 
cases where a state policy causes adverse treatment of caregivers and should be 
highlighted as evidence of discriminatory animus. 
If a plaintiff can establish discriminatory intent, the state must show that the 
practice serves important government objectives and is substantially related to 
these objectives.274  Although the state might articulate an important objective, 
such as efficiency or economic productivity, the fact that workplace structures 
are primarily socially constructed275 undermines the substantial relation of 
family-wage barriers to the government’s objective. Indeed, workplace structures 
that are considered inherent to work are in fact arbitrary and have little if any 
relation to the government’s objective in many cases.  One example, mentioned 
previously, is the requirement that Walsh work until five and her boss’s trial 
admission that this was not actually necessary to do the job.  As a result, the 
state’s policy violates women’s equal protection right to equal employment 
opportunity. 
Challenges to facially neutral policies have succeeded in the context of 
pregnancy discrimination, providing encouragement that claims on behalf of 
caregivers are possible.  A jury found that a police department’s facially neutral 
policy of excluding from light-duty status any officer who suffered an off-the-job 
injury, condition, or illness violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.276  The 
plaintiffs succeeded on their disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of 
 
 272. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1977). 
 273. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 57 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that, in a 
Title VII case, the fact that plaintiff’s boss specifically questioned whether plaintiff would be able to 
manage her work and family responsibilities after she told him that she was planning on having a 
second child and fired her shortly thereafter, constituted evidence of discriminatory animus); 
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that, in a Title VII case, the fact 
that at the time plaintiff, who was known to be pregnant, was fired, her supervisor said that she 
would be happier at home with her children, was direct evidence of discrimination). 
 274. If the policy is not facially neutral, is it subject to intermediate scrutiny: it must be 
substantially related to an important government interest. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 274 (1979). 
 275. See supra Section I. 
 276. Docket at 7–8, Lochren v.  Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-03925 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006), Doc. 
156-2; see also Lochren v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-3925, 2008 WL 2039458, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 9, 
2008). 
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liability and, in addition to a damage award, the police department changed its 
policy for pregnant women.277  Similar policies that place a disproportionate 
burden on caregivers should be challenged as violations of equal protection. 
Equal protection claims challenging adverse employment actions against 
caregivers and irrational state policies that lead to adverse treatment of 
caregivers is a natural trajectory of existing EPC jurisprudence, which established 
that state regulations that maintain the traditional male breadwinner-female 
caregiver model are unconstitutional.278  Overt regulations based on sex 
stereotypes may be all but obsolete, but a work structure that maintains these 
roles persists.  Challenging actions taken because of an employee’s caregiver 
status, failures to make AWAs for those with caregiving responsibilities, and 
policies that maintain family-wage barriers or penalize caregivers, is the next 
step in fully eradicating gender stereotypes and employment inequality.  This 
step acknowledges that women are primary caregivers.  When faced with family-
wage barriers, evolving EPC jurisprudence to recognize claims of caregiver 
discrimination keeps developments in law at pace with developments in society. 
Furthermore, the EPC’s protection against gender discrimination in the 
workplace maintains a meaning that is not merely duplicative of Title VII.279  The 
rights guaranteed by the EPC are broader than those protected by Title VII. 
Limiting the EPC by deferring to legislation disrupts the proper role of the Court 
as the branch of government responsible for defining the scope of constitutional 
rights. 
B. Substantive Due Process Rights 
Family-wage barriers also jeopardize rights guaranteed by the Substantive 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, underscoring the idea that 
the issue of women’s workforce attachment has constitutional liberty 
dimensions.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”280  Due process of law includes a substantive due process 
right “that provides heightened protection against government interference with 
certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.”281  One such liberty interest is 
the fundamental right to privacy.282  The Court recognizes the right to privacy in 
a variety of contexts, at least three of which are implicated in addressing family-
 
 277. Docket at 7–8, Lochren v.  Cnty. of Suffolk, No. CV 01-03925 (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2006), Doc. 
152. 
 278. See supra Section I. 
 279. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara, Cnty., 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987) (rejecting the 
notion that the obligation of a public employer under Title VII must be identical to its obligations 
under the Constitution, stating “[t]he fact that a public employer must also satisfy the Constitution 
does not negate the fact that the statutory prohibition with which that employer must consent was not 
intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution”). 
 280. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. This section addresses one of two theories under which a plaintiff 
can bring a substantive due process claim, the deprivation of a protected liberty or property interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 281. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (quotations omitted). 
 282. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (explaining that the right to individual privacy is 
contained in a variety of clauses throughout the Constitution). 
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wage barriers: the right to pursue a career of one’s choosing283 and the rights to 
bear284 and rear one’s children.285  Women might forgo or delay having children 
to pursue their career because of the state’s failure to offer AWAs or might be 
forced out of the workplace after having children.  Working mothers might also 
be forced to choose between personally rearing their children and working.286 
They might be forced to rear their children in a different way than they would 
choose without discriminatory work structures.  Family-wage barriers 
simultaneously compromise a woman’s right to pursue a career of her choosing 
and her rights to bear and rear her children. 
Even if a violation of a fundamental liberty interest is not ultimately 
recognized in the context of family-wage barriers, raising the liberty interest 
implicated will inform the EPC analysis.  The Court has considered the liberty 
interest at stake when examining a classification for equal protection purposes.287 
Including a claim for a violation of substantive due process in a potential lawsuit 
helps to educate the court about the social reality faced by working women with 
caregiving responsibilities and the severe consequences of family-wage barriers 
for women’s economic security, ultimately informing the equal protection 
analysis.  Further, the tension between the liberty interests implicated more 
broadly demonstrates how the law excludes women’s experiences and treats 
work as separate from caregiving.   
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that strict scrutiny applies to 
violations of substantive due process; the infringement must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.288  Applying the strict scrutiny 
standard, and assuming that the Court would recognize an infringement of a 
 
 283. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (stating “the liberty component of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause includes some generalized due process right to choose 
one’s field of private employment”); Engquist v.  Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 997–98 (9th Cir. 
2007) (holding that there is substantive due process protection against government employer actions 
that foreclose access to a particular profession to the same degree as government regulation). 
 284. Women’s right “to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so 
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child,” Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972), is rooted in the body of reproductive rights precedent establishing a 
fundamental right to procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 541 (1942), use contraception, 
Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965), and terminate a pregnancy, Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. 
“[Griswald v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe v. Wade] were interpreted as construing the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to decide 
whether or not to beget or bear a child.” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 285. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (opining that “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized” by the Supreme Court is “the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children”); 
see Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 118, 118 n.6 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(suggesting that a claim for a violation of one’s right to bear and rear children might be present in 
caregiver discrimination cases). 
 286. See Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991) (stating “women as 
capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a 
child and having a job”); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–48 (1975) (striking state 
regulation forcing pregnant teachers out of their jobs because the policy “unduly penalize[d] a female 
teacher for deciding to bear a child”). 
 287. See, e.g., Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (relying on the fundamental nature of the 
rights to marry and procreate to inform the EPC analysis). 
 288. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993) (considering liberty interests when evaluating 
a claim relying on the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee). 
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substantive due process right, a state’s maintenance of an inflexible work 
structure would not be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest—
presumably optimum economic productivity—particularly if reasonable 
alternatives existed.  But courts do not always apply strict scrutiny to substantive 
due process claims.289  Indeed, one difficulty in gauging the success of these 
claims is the inconsistency with which courts apply any particular standard.  
Nevertheless, even if a lower level of scrutiny applies, a viable argument is that 
the infringement is unjustified if reasonable alternatives exist that are only mildly 
burdensome for the state to adopt. Consequently, convincing a court that an 
infringement of a substantive due process right has occurred is the greatest 
obstacle to a substantive due process claim.  Not only would recognition of the 
rights violations in the context of women’s workplace attachment establish a new 
claim, but courts’ analyses of whether there is an infringement are extremely 
contextual, amorphous and conflated with a balancing of the state’s interest. 
Therefore, it is difficult to predict how a court would receive such claims.  
1. Right to Pursue an Occupation 
A plaintiff will have the most difficulty establishing a violation of the right 
to pursue a career of one’s choice, where infringement is limited to “extreme 
cases” in which state action “effectively banned a person from a 
profession . . . .”290  Only state regulations that affect a “complete prohibition of 
the right to engage in a calling, and not [a] . . . brief interruption” have been held 
unconstitutional in violation of the right to pursue a career.291  Family-wage 
barriers do not overtly operate as a complete bar to employment or a profession, 
making it difficult to establish a claim for an infringement of this right. However, 
there are Title VII cases in which employers’ actions based on caregiver status 
implicated the right to pursue an occupation 
Consider Joann Trezza, whose claim for discriminatory failure to promote 
based on her status as a mother survived summary judgment because her 
employer failed to present evidence that men with children were also passed 
over for a promotion.292  Trezza was twice passed over for a promotion in favor 
of an unmarried woman without children and a married man with children.293 
After not being promoted the first time around, Trezza asked her employer why 
she did not get the job and was told “because she had a family they assumed she 
would not be interested in the position.”294  The second time, Trezza urged a 
Senior Vice President to review her employment record and provide her with a 
 
 289. Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (informing that the right to choose one’s 
field of private employment is subject to reasonable government regulation); LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640 
(stating that government action interfering with the right to bear children cannot be needless, 
arbitrary, or capricious); Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny, in which the challenged regulation must be substantially related to an important 
government interest, to a challenge based on parental rights). 
 290. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 479 F.3d 985, 997–98 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 291. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 at 292. 
 292. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98-CIV-2205, 1998 WL 912101, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998). 
 293. Id. at *1. 
 294. Id. 
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reason for not being promoted.295  Two months later, Trezza was promoted.296 
Several years later, Trezza requested to be considered for the Managing 
Attorney position, after the previous Managing Attorney retired.297  For a third 
time, she was not considered for the promotion, despite having the highest 
performance evaluations of those with comparable seniority status.298  The 
position remained open for an indefinite period, and was ultimately filled by a 
woman without children and with “considerably less legal experience” than 
Trezza.299  The discrimination Trezza faced based on her status as a mother 
impeded her right to pursue her occupation. 
Sometimes, employers rely on mistaken assumptions based on sex 
stereotypes, which prevent caregivers from advancing in their careers.  Laurie 
Chadwick worked as a “Recovery Specialist” for an insurance company.300  She 
had young children and was not promoted, despite being the presumed 
frontrunner because of her greater years of experience and higher performance 
reviews, and because she had already taken on some of the responsibilities of the 
new position. 301  When a woman with older children was offered the job instead, 
the hiring decision maker told Chadwick, “you’re going to school, you have the 
kids and you just have a lot on your plate right now.”302  Chadwick was told that 
the decision maker and other supervisors would feel “‘overwhelmed’ in the same 
circumstances.”303  In reality, Chadwick’s husband was the primary caregiver of 
their children, and he worked nights and weekends.304  The court noted that Title 
VII does not protect against caregiving responsibilities.  Without deciding 
whether Chadwick could recover based on a “sex plus [caregiving]” theory of 
liability, the court reversed summary judgment for the defendant by relying on 
Chadwick’s claim of sex discrimination based on sex stereotyping, which was 
established as sex discrimination by Price Waterhouse.305  
Trezza’s and Chadwick’s cases demonstrate how employers’ decisions 
based on an employee’s caregiver status and sex stereotypes about that status 
jeopardize the right to pursue an occupation.  Although these cases rely on a sex-
stereotyping theory of liability, employer actions based solely on caregiver status 
also jeopardize a woman’s right to pursue an occupation.306  Establishing a claim 
based on the right to occupation may be difficult because, even if the state’s 
 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. at *2. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc., 561 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 301. See id. at 41–42 (comparing the candidate who was offered the promotion and the plaintiff, 
noting that the chosen candidate received lower performance reviews than the plaintiff, and had 
worked fewer years than the plaintiff). 
 302. Id. at 42. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46–47; see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235–36 (1989) 
(stating that comments based on gender norms were evidence of sex-based stereotyping and could 
indicate sex discrimination). 
 306. See, e.g., Chadwick, 561 F.3d at 46. 
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inflexible work structures and policies prevent a woman with caregiving 
responsibilities from pursuing her state employment, or limit her career 
advancement generally, the work structure maintained by the state action does 
not permanently bar her employment.  Regardless, asserting such a claim is 
useful for framing the issue as one that has liberty dimensions, even if the court 
ultimately decides that they are not encompassed by the constitution. 
Assuming the state denied the right to pursue an occupation due to family-
wage barriers, the state’s maintenance of inflexible work structures would likely 
be subject to a reasonableness review.307  The reasonableness of the state’s 
interest in maintaining these barriers is questionable, particularly when 
alternative work arrangements can be made.  If an AWA can be made, the 
employee can perform the job without hardship to the employer.  Furthermore, 
the irrationality of maintaining the family-wage barriers is accentuated if the 
action is unrelated to the worker’s performance and rather a result of animus 
towards caregivers. 
Although a claim based on a right to pursue an occupation is unlikely to 
succeed, this discussion highlights the way in which family-wage barriers have 
liberty dimensions.  Furthermore, it helps to bolster the unreasonableness of an 
employer’s refusal, in many cases, to grant an AWA.  
2. Right to Reproductive Freedom 
Family-wage barriers might compel women to delay or forgo  having 
children at all, or they might prevent a woman from returning to work after 
having a child,308 which infringes on her reproductive freedom.  Reproductive 
freedom jurisprudence primarily addresses the constitutionality of a state action, 
taken to protect the “potentiality of human life”309  which incentivizes women to 
have children, or purports to protect women or unborn children.310  In Cleveland 
Board of Education. v. LaFleur, the Supreme Court held that a statute prescribing 
mandatory maternity leave for pregnant women before and after the birth of a 
child was unconstitutional.311  The Court stated that the mandatory leave policies 
 
 307. Connecticut v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1999) (indicating that the right to choose one’s 
field of private employment is subject to reasonable government regulation). 
 308. As an example of how these fundamental rights collide in this context, the state’s interest in 
women bearing children, deemed reasonable by the Court, and the policies implemented to further 
that interest, compel women to have children and, as a result, force them out of the workforce due to 
the inherently discriminatory work structure. 
 309. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 310. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (identifying a state interest in 
protecting potential life); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 450–51 (1983) 
(holding that the state’s interest in protecting maternal health was not served by a law that required a 
mandatory waiting period for abortions); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (finding 
unconstitutional a parental consent requirement designed to ensure that minors contemplating 
abortion act in their best interest); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (affirming the right to an 
abortion); Griswald v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding unconstitutional a law 
prohibiting distribution of birth control). 
 311. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–48 (1975), with Sokol v. Smith, 
671 F. Supp. 1243, 1246–47 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (relying on Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) to uphold a 
state regulation prohibiting Medicaid funding for abortions that were not medically necessary, even 
though funding for childbirth was provided, because the state has an interest in encouraging 
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placed a heavy burden on the exercise of the right to bear children and 
“needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge[d] upon this vital area of a 
[woman’s] constitutional liberty.”312 
Like the state regulations at issue in LaFleur, inflexible work structures place 
a heavy burden on women’s reproductive freedom.  One-fifth of women aged 
between forty and forty-four were childless in 2007; in 2001, “[n]early half of 
women with annual incomes above $100,000 had no children . . . .”313  Certainly 
some of these women made a conscious choice not to have children. However, 
others end up without children because they cannot fit children into their work-
life without sacrificing their professional accomplishments.314  This “complicated 
calculus around the question of having children” defies the notion of 
reproductive choice.315  When a choice of if and when to have a child is confined 
by unreasonable workplace structures and policies that favor non-caregivers, it 
becomes so limited that few or no options exist. 
For example, a receptionist alleged that she was terminated for being 
pregnant.316  Karen Rosales’s employer told her that it “wasn’t the best time” for 
her to have a second baby, and “to not have a baby at [this] time.”317  When she 
was fired while pregnant her employer explained, “maybe it’s best if [you are] at 
home.”318  The court held that these comments created an issue of fact regarding 
the employer’s true reason for terminating the receptionist.319  The court also 
acknowledged that Rosales had a choice forced by her employer: keep her job or 
have a child.  If these were Rosales’s options, Rosales had almost no choice, and 
the limited choice she had was dictated by her employer—a third party—
uninvolved in her pregnancy or the consequences that may arise from it.  
Similarly, Patricia Leahy was fired from her position as a stock supervisor at 
an Old Navy retail store after more than seven years of employment with the 
company.320  Shortly after Leahy advised her supervisors that she was pregnant 
with her second child, she was subjected to derogatory remarks about her work 
and work hours.321  She submitted an accommodation request to her supervisor 
that stated she could perform all of her duties up until her maternity leave, with 
the exception of heavy lifting, climbing, and other strenuous activity.322  Her 
supervisors harassed her to withdraw the letter, which Leahy refused to do.323  
 
childbirth, and finding no violation of a fundamental right to bear children resulting from 
unemployment compensation statute that provided unemployment compensation only to employees 
who left their employment because of the type of  work or the employer, indicating that women did 
not have to choose between having a child and employment). 
 312. LaFleur, 414 U.S. at 640. 
 313. LERNER, supra note 9, at 90–91. 
 314. Id. at 91–92. 
 315. Id. at 92. 
 316. Rosales v. Keyes, No. 06-20471, 2007 WL 29245, at *2 (S.D. Fl. Jan. 3, 2007). 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at *6. 
 320. Leahy v. Gap, Inc., No. 07-2008, 2008 WL 2946007, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
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She was subsequently terminated.324 
Women might also feel compelled to terminate a pregnancy because of an 
employer’s policy. Yaire Lopez almost made such a choice after her employer 
fired her when her boss learned she was pregnant.325  Lopez, already a single 
mother of two, was so desperate to keep her paycheck that she decided to have 
an abortion. She only changed her mind because, as she said, “they were twins 
and I didn’t want to feel guilty for two lives. So my thought was like forget about 
my financial stuff. If I lose my house, if I lose everything I didn’t care at that 
moment, I just wanted to continue with my pregnancy.”326  Her statement 
demonstrates her limited options, the difficult choice she faced, and her dire 
financial straits. 
The animus expressed by employers in these cases extends beyond 
pregnancy, and tells women that they need to choose between having children 
and a career.  As exemplified by the case of Shireen Walsh, women who become 
mothers are more likely to be the target of discrimination than women without 
children, and men.327  Although inflexible work structures and policies might be 
necessary in some workplaces, many times they are based on the social 
construction of work as defined by strict time norms.  These inflexible work 
structures “needlessly, arbitrarily, or capriciously impinge” on women’s right to 
bear children.328  When reasonable alternatives exist that allow a woman to 
remain a productive employee and freely choose whether and when to have 
children, a state’s policy that maintains family-wage barriers infringes on a 
woman’s substantive due process rights. 
3. Right to Control One’s Child’s Upbringing 
Finally, family-wage barriers might infringe on a parent’s right to control 
her child’s upbringing.329  This right includes the responsibility to inculcate 
“moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship.”330 
Although in “certain circumstances the parental right to control the upbringing 
of a child must give way to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the school 
environment,”331 “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., 
is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private 
realm of family . . . .”332  A state can act to guard the general well-being of a child 
by, for example, requiring vaccinations and school attendance or prohibiting 
 
 324. Id. 
 325. Lopez v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. CGC 05445104, 2009 WL 1090375, at *5–6 (Cal. App. 
Dist. 1 Apr. 23, 2009). 
 326. LERNER, supra note 9, at 27–28; Bimbo Bakeries, 2009 WL 1090375 at *5. 
 327. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003); see supra Section 
IV(A)(2)(b). 
 328. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 640 (1975). 
 329. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). 
 330. Id. 
 331. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 182 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 332. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 668 (2000) (plurality); see also Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 
F.3d 935, 952 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding a curfew law unconstitutional because it violated parents’ right 
to raise their children without interference). 
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child labor.333  But when a state seeks to impose “ideas of morality and gender 
roles” on a child,334 alienates a child from the parent under circumstances that 
“shock the conscience,”335 or fails to give deference to a parent’s decision about 
the upbringing of her child, the state infringes on a parent’s rights.336  A state’s 
maintenance of family-wage barriers infringes on a parent’s right to control her 
children’s upbringing when she is forced to leave work to rear children.  Family-
wage barriers might “coerce parents into permitting [the state] to impose on their 
children . . . ideas of morality and gender roles”337 because they force mothers to 
set an example that reinforces stereotypes of gender roles when they might not 
otherwise choose to do so.  
Perhaps that was not necessarily the case for Devorah Gartner, but she is a 
mother who was forced to quit her job to care for her disabled newborn in the 
way she and her husband felt was most appropriate for their family.338  Prior to 
having their daughter, Devorah and Bob Gartner worked full-time.339  They 
made a combined household income of over $100,000, owned their home, took 
regular vacations, and generally lived comfortably.340  Devorah had a 
complicated pregnancy and needed bed rest, which ultimately forced the 
Gartners into medical debt.341  After their daughter was born, Devorah and Bob 
continued to work full-time, hoping that they would be able to pay off their 
debt.342  Devorah worked nights and Bob worked days; they handed off their 
newborn in the midst of their commutes to and from work.343  But they soon 
found out that their daughter had likely suffered a stroke in the uterus and 
would require a physical therapy routine six times per day, in addition to usual 
infant care.344 
To meet the needs of their daughter in the limited window of time that they 
had to ensure her best chance for progress, Devorah, who loved her job and 
 
 333. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944). 
 334. Compare Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 151 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that plaintiff was likely 
to succeed on the merits of her substantive due process claims for a violation of parental rights based 
on the District Attorney’s requirement that  her daughter’ attend  a program about the morality of her 
behavior at issue), with Anspach ex rel. Anspach v. City of Phila. Dep’t of Health, 503 F.3d 256, 262–63 
(3d Cir. 2007) (finding no violation of parental rights when parents were not notified of their 
daughters possible pregnancy after she sought advice from a health center counselor because the 
daughter had a privacy interest and there was no coercive behavior that interfered with the parent-
child relationship: the daughter could have told her parents and was not discouraged from doing so). 
 335. Rosenbaum v. Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d  1071, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding no violation of 
substantive due process where a parent was separated from his children for a short time during his 
arrest). 
 336. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68. See also, Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Foster, 657 F.3d 463, 480–81 
(7th Cir. 2011) (holding there was “a genuine dispute of fact about whether a reasonable person . . . 
would have understood that continuing to hold [a minor] in protective custody violated the 
[parent’s] clearly established constitutional rights”). 
 337. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 150–51 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 338. LERNER, supra note 9, at 13. 
 339. Id. at 7. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. at 8–10. 
 342. Id. at 11. 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. at 11–12. 
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earned almost twice what Bob earned at the time, asked to take a month off of 
work.345 She was flatly refused; she had already used her sick and vacation 
time.346  When again she requested time off and was denied, Devorah had no 
choice but to quit her job, accruing even more debt.347 
Additionally, when women attempt to fit their child caregiving 
responsibilities into inflexible work structures, an employer might force them to 
sacrifice their preferred child rearing styles or methods.  Women may be forced 
to place children in non-preferred care, or forego doctors’ appointments to 
preserve employment.  Consider Betty Jones, a low-income single mother who 
found herself in a bind when her car broke down and she could not afford to fix 
it.348  Because Jones could not jeopardize her employment as a custodian for a 
hospital, her eleven-year old son became responsible for getting himself and his 
younger sister to school on a city bus, and then to their grandmother’s house 
after school.349  The grandmother took the kids to her evening job and dropped 
them off at home at ten or eleven at night.350  The lack of flexibility of Jones’ job 
ultimately forced her to risk her children’s safety. 
If the plaintiff demonstrates an infringement of her rights, a court is likely to 
apply intermediate scrutiny, which requires the government (i.e., the employer) 
to show that the infringement is substantially related to an important 
government interest.351  Again, the existence of reasonable alternatives attenuates 
the substantial relation between the family-wage barriers and the state’s interest. 
A claim for a violation of any of these rights has several obstacles, including  
the analysis of balancing the state’s interest and that the challenges to state action 
have mostly been to an overt act, usually a statute, which makes it easily 
distinguishable from a state’s seemingly passive maintenance of family-wage 
barriers.  In light of the difficulty of establishing a claim for these liberty interest 
violations, the true value of asserting them lies in further contextualization of the 
issue of family-wage barriers as one of constitutional importance.  Furthermore, 
the assertion of these claims encourages courts to consider the state interests 
involved in maintaining a work structure that is discriminatory against women, 
particularly when reasonable alternatives exist.  Even if a substantive due 
process violation is not ultimately established, the analysis can help highlight the 
unreasonableness of a state’s interest in maintaining an inflexible work structure 
and the importance of the rights at issue.  By raising these claims, a court can 
begin to contextualize the way in which family-wage barriers infringe on 
women’s liberty.  This context thereby informs the court’s equal protection 
analysis.352 
 
 345. Id. at 12. 
 346. Id. at 12–13. 
 347. Id. at 13. 
 348. Williams & Boushey, supra note 27, at 19. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See, e.g., Hutchins v. D.C., 188 F.3d 531, 541 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (applying intermediate scrutiny, 
in which the challenged regulation must be substantially related to an important government interest, 
to a challenge based on parental rights). 
 352. See supra Section IV(A). 
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In Hibbs, the Supreme Court acknowledged that women’s role as primary 
caregivers implicates women’s right to equal employment opportunity as 
guaranteed by the Constitution.  By challenging violations of this right caused by 
family-wage barriers, the Court can begin to reconceptualize existing EPC 
jurisprudence.  Doing so will allow the  Court to keep EPC jurisprudence in line 
with women’s changed role as wage earner and caregiver.  It will also help to 
eradicate employment discrimination and gender stereotypes in the more subtle 
forms as they exist today. 
V. JUDICIAL REMEDIES TO ELIMINATE FAMILY-WAGE BARRIERS 
A variety of remedies may be available to a plaintiff who establishes a 
constitutional claim for a violation of her equal protection or substantive due 
process rights.  This section focuses on the judicial prophylactic remedy that 
requires an employer to eliminate family-wage barriers for employees with 
caregiving responsibilities.  Prophylactic remedies are a subset of equitable relief 
aimed at directing conduct affiliated with, rather than directly causing, a harm.353 
As a result, these remedies affect a broader range of conduct than that targeted 
by injunctive relief.  The elimination of family-wage barriers might mean that 
employers are required to offer AWAs or revise policies and practices that 
penalize caregivers.  For women who are only able to do their job with an AWA, 
such a remedy would provide the structural change they need to work and fulfill 
their caregiving responsibilities.  This remedy also challenges society’s 
assumptions about the inherent nature of the work structure and characteristics 
of an ideal worker.354  By directing employers’ conduct, a prophylactic remedy 
can help change the way that employers perceive employees with caregiving 
responsibilities and alleviate adverse employment actions based on caregiver 
status, such as the hostile environment and disparate treatment exemplified 
above.355  Changes to the work structure will also allow families to further 
control how working adults in a household divide caregiving responsibilities.  
Consequently, men might begin to shoulder more caregiving responsibilities and 
the division of labor between genders at home could change, better supporting 
women’s workplace attachment. 
The elimination of family-wage barriers is necessary to guarantee the 
fundamental rights to equal employment opportunity, to have and raise 
children, and to pursue a career of one’s choice.  Requiring AWAs redresses 
violations of these rights by challenging family-wage barriers.  This remedy 
would “provide tangible meaning to . . . the contours of those rights”356 without 
redefining fundamental rights or creating a new right. 
The Supreme Court and Congress have a constitutional power to grant 
prophylactic relief.357  Although prophylactic relief is most commonly viewed 
 
 353. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of 
Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 314 (2004). 
 354. See supra Section I. 
 355. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., 332 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2003). 
 356. Thomas, supra note 353, at 311–12. 
 357. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437–42 (2000) (implying that the Court and 
Congress share power to create prophylactic remedies). 
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and imposed as an exercise of Congressional power, a court’s Article III 
jurisdiction over “[c]ases . . . [and] [c]ontroversies”358 grants it greater flexibility 
to implement prophylactic remedies than Congress.  While “judicial powers may 
be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation,”359 “[o]nce a right and 
a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to 
remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable 
remedies.”360  The Supreme Court defines constitutional rights and, when 
prophylactic relief prescribed by the Court is constitutionally based, Congress 
cannot supersede it.361  Congress’ prophylactic remedies must have “congruence 
and proportionality” to the proven harm, and the Court ultimately determines 
whether a Congressional remedy meets that standard.362  In addressing 
Congressional power to prescribe prophylactic remedies in Hibbs, the Supreme 
Court recognized that affirmative entitlements form a component of sex 
discrimination law.363  However, the affirmative entitlements prescribed by 
Congress thus far have fallen short of effecting full equality.364  This shortcoming 
bolsters the point that “prophylactic relief is necessary, and even integral, to 
effective judicial response to existing complex problems” because prophylactic 
relief “allows the courts to address all of the factors” contributing to the wrong 
with precision.365 Since courts can implement similar, broader, and more flexible 
prophylactic relief than that provided by federal legislation thus far, Hibbs 
provides a foundation for the judiciary’s use of affirmative entitlements. 
Courts exercise their power to direct conduct affiliated with, rather than 
directly causing, harm in a variety of contexts.  For example,  courts have 
 
 358. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (2006). 
 359. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (affirming prophylactic 
remedies for school desegregation and stating that a school desegregation case does not differ 
fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable relief to repair the denial of a 
constitutional right). 
 360. Id. at 15. 
 361. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437–42 (distinguishing between Court remedies that are 
constitutionally and non-constitutionally based in analyzing whether a statute that undermined the 
Court’s Miranda rule was a valid exercise of Congressional power). 
 362. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997); see also Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 811 F. 
Supp. 2d 424, 457 (D.D.C. 2011) (articulating a three-step analysis to review Congress’ enactment of 
remedial prophylactic legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as follows: (1) 
identify a constitutional right that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted a challenged 
legislation; (2) “examine whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional 
[conduct] by the [s]tate that justified the enactment of a remedial measure”; and (3) “decide whether 
the challenged legislation constitutes an appropriate response to the identified history and pattern of 
unconstitutional conduct,” i.e., whether is it congruent and proportional to targeted violation 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 363. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003); see also Dinner, supra note 27, 
at 421 (acknowledging that “[c]ontemporary equal-protection doctrine has come to recognize that 
affirmative social-welfare entitlements form an important component of sex discrimination law” and 
that it will be necessary for Congress to build on this base and provide new interventions and 
entitlements to advance sex equality). 
 364. See supra Sections I–II; see also Naomi Gerstel & Amy Armenia, Giving and Taking Family 
Leaves: Right or Privilege?, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 164–65 (2009) (describing the limited impact of 
FMLA and the ways that compliance with FMLA tends to exacerbate gender inequality in the 
workplace). 
 365. Thomas, supra note 353, at 324. 
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required changes in employment policies, trainings, and monitoring to alleviate 
discrimination.366  These remedies establish organizational cultures designed to 
avoid the harm and allow the defendant to self-regulate against future harms.367 
Instead of simply compensating a single plaintiff with injunctive relief or 
monetary damages, these changes can begin to break down family-wage barriers 
on an institutional level. 
Prophylactic remedies must be narrowly targeted at redressing the proven 
harm, not at an ancillary social problem, and the conduct targeted must 
demonstrate a causal link to the harm.368  A causal link exists when the conduct 
bears a factual relationship and is of a sufficiently close degree to the harm.369 
Where a constitutional violation has been found, the remedy does not exceed the 
violation if the remedy is tailored to cure the “condition that offends the 
constitution.”370  The Congressional findings favorably cited by the Supreme 
Court in upholding the FMLA in Hibbs indicate that the FMLA’s deficiencies 
have EPC implications.371  The findings pave the way for  courts to exercise their 
own prophylactic power to remedy the constitutional violations resulting from 
family-wage barriers. 
If the statistical evidence cited by Congress in enacting the FMLA indicates 
the patterns of an individual state employer, a causal link between the conduct 
ordered and the harm exists.  The specific remedy of requiring an employer to 
offer AWAs to people with caregiving responsibilities is an antidiscrimination 
measure that furthers equality.  This remedy protects fundamental rights, 
without resulting in something more for the protected group. AWAs eliminate 
family-wage barriers that exclude women from equal participation in the 
workplace.372  Employers might criticize AWAs for being too costly, but evidence 
suggests that offering AWAs “hold the promise to save money by decreasing the 
 
 366. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., No. 09-6460, 2011 WL 
3648483, at *1–4  (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 2011) (requiring a sexual harassment policy, notice of the verdict, 
and sexual harassment training to correct and prevent sexual harassment in the workplace); Equal 
Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. D.C.P. Midstream, L.P., 608 F. Supp. 2d 115, 116 (D. Me. 2009) 
(requiring training and monitoring in response to a claim of a racially hostile work environment); 
Sherman v. Kasotakis, 314 F. Supp. 2d 843, 886 (N.D. Iowa 2004) (ordering a restaurant to adopt 
policies and practices to eliminate race discrimination in public accommodations); Spina v. Forest 
Pres. Dist. of Cook Cnty., No. 98-C-1393, 2002 WL 1769994, at *4 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2002) (requiring the 
defendant law enforcement agency to maintain separate locker facilities for female officers and adopt 
a zero policy tolerance for violators of a sexual harassment policy). 
 367. Thomas, supra note 353, at 326. 
 368. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280–82 (1977). 
 369. Id. at 280–81 (stating that the “nature and scope” of a remedy must be confined to the 
constitutional harm); see, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992) (stating “vestiges of 
segregation must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being remedied”). 
 370. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 282. 
 371. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 n. 11 (2003); Family Medical Leave Act 
29 U.S.C.A. § 2601(a) (2006). 
 372. This is akin to the argument that ADA accommodations are antidiscrimination measures that 
challenge an arbitrary physical environment built around a particular person. See Michael Ashley 
Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
579, 586–87 (2004) (presenting perceived limitations in the workplace as  primarily social constructs 
that are the result of bias, assumptions, or employer habit, but not because of actual physical 
inability). 
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costs associated with attrition, absenteeism, recruiting, quality control, and 
productivity.”373  Consequently, the remedy not only furthers equality in the 
workplace, but it may also be good for business. 
The court’s power to impose prophylactic remedies, and their use in parallel 
contexts, supports judicial remedies for family-wage barriers.  Prophylactic 
remedies specifically target conduct affiliated with violations of fundamental 
rights and are necessary to ensure the practical enforcement of women’s equal 
protection and substantive due process rights.  If the courts do not remedy 
family-wage barriers, and women remain society’s primary caregivers, women’s 
equal protection and substantive due process rights will be jeopardized because 
women will be forced to choose between work and caregiving.  The imposition 
of AWAs would change the structure of work for all employees and facilitate 
women’s workplace attachment while challenging traditional sex roles. 
CONCLUSION 
Impact litigation must be used in conjunction with other methods of cause-
lawyering to eliminate family-wage barriers to workplace attachment.  This 
article provides a backdrop for advocates to develop a cohesive litigation 
strategy for pursuing these claims.  As these strategies develop, certain claims or 
theories might succumb to others, depending on the many variables at play.  
Regardless, litigation is integral to recognizing the fundamental rights are at 
stake at the intersection of caregiving and family-wage work structures.  In Hibbs, 
the Supreme Court validated the use of prophylactic remedies in achieving 
women’s employment equality through structural changes to the workplace.374  
The Court acknowledged that gender equality issues arise at the intersection of 
work and caregiving.  Thus, Hibbs lays a foundation for a court to use its Article 
III powers to prescribe these types of remedies and break down family-wage 
barriers confronted by the women forced to choose between work and caring for 
their children.  
 
 
 373. Williams & Segal, supra note 71, at 87–88. 
 374. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003). 
